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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Roger, a nineteen year-old sophomore at West Virginia University, opened his dormitory mailbox to find a letter offering a too-good-to-betrue deal on a "platinum" credit card in Roger's name. Many of Roger's friends
had come to college with shiny new cards, and, as all the commercials said, who
couldn't use a little extra spending power? It seemed like a good idea.
Upon opening the envelope, it seemed even better. Roger found that he
had been pre-approved for a $2,500 line of credit with "no-interest*" for 12
months and a 0.0% APR. To top it off, the card was "affiliated" with West Virginia University and could be customized with the logo of Roger's favorite
team-the Mountaineers.' Applying for the card was as easy as flipping past a
few pages of fine print (just like those tedious software license agreements he
ignored on a daily basis), filling in some personal information, and signing on

Many colleges and college alumni associations have entered into contracts with banks and
credit card companies that offer schools incentives for steering students toward their programs or
payments in return for lists of students' names. See Jonathan D. Glater, The Debt Trap-Colleges
Profit as Banks Market Credit Cards to Students, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2009, at Bl; Editorial, Responsible Use of Credit a Must for Students, THE STATE NEWS, Oct. 13, 2008,
http://www.statenews.com/index.php/article/2008/10/responsible-use-of credit_a_mustforstud
ents. The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act),
which went into effect on February 22, 2010, did not ban credit card companies from parterning
with colleges and universities, but it did limit the formation of these partnerships. CARD Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1742 (2009).
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the dotted line. 2 In days, Roger, now feeling rather grown-up, had his own shiny new card and was ready for action.
Over the next few years, Roger came to rely more and more on his plastic purchasing power. At first, he purchased only large-ticket items, like airline
tickets, and paid the balance immediately. But gradually, Roger started to use
the card for everyday purchases, such as nice dinners with his girlfriend and
even a spring break trip to the beach. As Roger's spending increased, so did his
credit limit, although the 0% APR was long gone having been replaced by a
scheme of sliding rates from 14% to 28%. Nevertheless, Roger forged on, making minimum monthly payments as his balance increased. When his hard drive
melted down the week before finals, he was happy to learn that his new "platinum" privileges allowed him to take out a $2,000 cash advance. Roger relied
on his card and used it so frequently that by graduation he had earned not only a
bachelor's degree but also a credit card balance of more than $5,000.
Due to the lagging economy, Roger had difficulty finding work, but was
able to make ends meet by buying on credit and even taking out additional cash
advances. As he struggled to pay his bills, his rent, and particularly his student
loan payments, his credit card balance ballooned to more than $13,000. Eventually, he could no longer make even the minimum payments, and that's when
the calls began at his home, his office, and sometimes even his parents' home. 3
Then one day, Roger heard a radio advertisement that changed his life:
Are you buried in credit card debt? Having trouble making
minimum monthly payments to your creditors? Tired of receiving harassingcollection calls? Then DebtBet America is the solution to all your problems. At DebtBet, our experienced and
highly trainedadvocates will go to work for you, negotiating directly with your creditorsfor a drastic reduction of debt-you'll
pay only pennies on the dollar! DebtBet is a low-risk program
designedfor consumers who want to avoid the perils of bankruptcy while regaining their financialfreedom. Call now to
speak with a certified counselor who can put you on the path to
financial independence-or visit us on our website for a personal credit evaluation. At DebtBet, we get resultsfor you!4
Under the CARD Act, credit cards can no longer be issued to individuals under the age of
twenty-one without a co-signor or proof of independent income. CARD Act § 301.
3
Such collection calls are regulated under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1692(a)-(p) (2006).
4
The text of this advertisement is based on actual advertisements appearing in national campaigns on satellite and syndicated radio networks. Although it appears that debt settlement companies prefer the low cost of radio advertising, television ads typically styled as "breaking news"
segments have begun appearing on late night television. See, e.g., TVleadsl, TV Debt Settlement
Leads 1-800-371-1112, YouTUBE (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?vh_2l2rPmE9M&feature-related.
2
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As the advertisement urged, Roger visited the company's website to
learn more.5 There he found laudatory testimonials from satisfied customers,
the "truth about debt settlement," and a toll-free number he could call to reach
"certified debt settlement specialists." 6 Feeling better already, Roger dialed the
number.
A counselor at DebtBet America took Roger's call, asked a few questions, and, in mere minutes, performed a "personalized" debt analysis. Roger
was thrilled to learn that, according to the counselor, debt settlement was a lowrisk, guaranteed solution to his personal credit crisis. It was simple: Roger
would stop paying his creditors and instead make just one monthly payment to a
"settlement account" with DebtBet. Meanwhile, highly trained DebtBet specialists would negotiate with Roger's creditors on his behalf. In months, the company would settle his accounts for pennies on the dollar, and Roger would finally taste financial freedom.
In a few days, Roger received a 120-page contract from DebtBet. He
read the document as carefully as he could, then signed and returned it feeling
great.
But the collection calls began again-day and night-worse than before. One of his creditors threatened to sue. DebtBet was no help; "Sorry" they
said, "we don't represent you on that. It's in the contract." He was shocked to
learn that, although he had paid more than $1900 in fees, less than $200 had
actually been applied to his settlement.
"Just be patient," the voice on the phone reassured him. But for Roger,
"patient" meant continuing to pay monthly fees while his creditors became more
aggressive and his debt crisis only grew worse. He made it two more months
before withdrawing from the program. Although he later learned that DebtBet
had not contacted a single creditor, the company refused to return his money,
stating that the fees had been earned for "services rendered."
His credit ruined, and in worse financial shape than he started, Roger
contacted a local attorney who, for $1000, helped him seek discharge of his
debts through bankruptcy.
"It seemed like a good idea," he thought to himself.
Sadly, Roger's nightmare is hardly unique. As the economy continues
to underperform, many Americans, particularly young people, find themselves
neck-deep in debt with little chance of recovery.
First, this Note examines the growth and evolution of the debt settlement industry. Promising to lead consumers down a low-risk, high-success path
to financial freedom, debt settlement has become an attractive option for con5
Debt-settlement companies avoid initiating contact with consumers in order to keep from
falling under the scope of federal telemarketing regulation, such as the FTC Telemarketing Sales
Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2010). However, the West Virginia Attorney General asserts that inbound
calls from consumers to telemarketers are covered under the West Virginia Telemarketing Act,
W.VA. CODE §§ 46A-6F-101 to -703 (2006).
6
For a discussion of similar claims, see infra Part II.D.
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sumers who want to get back on their feet while avoiding bankruptcy. The
number of companies offering debt settlement services has exploded in the last
decade, and in 2009, hundreds of thousands of consumers put their hopes and
money in the hands of the debt settlement industry.
Unfortunately, debt settlement is not the best option for most consumers. Many unscrupulous debt settlement providers prey on unsophisticated consumers, assessing exorbitant fees for little or no services rendered. Even when
done "correctly," most consumer advocates feel that debt settlement is not an
ideal strategy for consumers struggling in debt, because the fees involved reduce
the funds available for paying creditors. A disturbingly low number of consumers who enroll in debt settlement plans actually complete the entire program.
Thus, bankruptcy or debt management plans are often a better option.
Against this backdrop of abuse, confusion, and a general lack of regulation in the new and rapidly growing debt settlement industry, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has developed
the Uniform Debt Management Services Act (UDMSA or Uniform Act), a
comprehensive model act regulating the debt relief industry, including debt settlement. Part A, Section III introduces the Uniform Act, which mandates certain
disclosures, limits fees, and provides for public and private enforcement and
remedies.
As part of the NCCUSL's efforts to promulgate the UDMSA in all
states, the Uniform Act was introduced to a subcommittee of the West Virginia
legislature in 2006. Though it was not formally introduced that year, it has continued to be the subject of legislative hearings and debate. As more and more
states adopt the Uniform Act, the pressure for West Virginia to accept the model
will only increase.
Unfortunately, the UDMSA is not an ideal solution for all states. In order to illuminate and refine the best practices and legal strategies to employ in
defending West Virginia's consumers from predatory debt settlement providers,
Part B, Section III investigates the West Virginia Attorney General's recent
actions against debt settlement companies. Finally, Section IV explores some
weaknesses of the Uniform Act as it compares to these legal strategies and concludes that, despite certain advantages inherent to uniform and comprehensive
regulation, the Attorney General's strategy is the best approach for West Virginia.

In a 2009 survey, The Association of Settlement Companies estimated that its approximately 200 member organizations served more than 154,000 active consumer clients and managed
more than $4.9 billion in debt as of June 30, 2009. Letter from Andrew Housser, The Ass'n of
Settlement Cos., to the Sec'y of the Fed. Trade Comm'n 4 (Oct. 26, 2009), available at
http://ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/543670-00202.pdf.
8
See infra Part II.D.5.
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II. THE PROLIFERATION AND PROBLEM OF THE DEBT SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY
A.

Debt Settlement DistinguishedFrom Debt Management

At the outset, it is important to draw the appropriate distinctions between the various types of programs that fall under the debt relief umbrella. A
debt management provider (DMP) helps consumers pay down debts through
monthly payment plans established by agreements with creditors. The DMP
may negotiate a reduction in interest rates, late-fees, and minimum payments.9
The DMP acts only as an advisor and manager; consumers make payments directly to creditors. Although, in the past, some for-profit DMPs were found to
have engaged in a number of unfair and deceptive practices, regulatory action
by state and federal agencies has drastically reduced the incidence of such
abuses.10

Debt settlement works on an entirely different model. Rather than negotiating a decrease in fees or rates, debt settlement companies attempt to negotiate lump-sum settlements of entire accounts. In most cases, consumers engaged in debt settlement plans do not make payments directly to their creditors.12
Various related programs and services are sometimes linked to the debt
settlement and debt management industries. The National Association of Attorneys General reports on a "new breed" of debt relief services-the "debt negotiation" model-which claims the ability to negotiate dramatic and immediate
interest rate reductions that can save thousands of dollars in a matter of
months.13 Such companies market their insider knowledge of the consumer debt
industry and promise to negotiate rapid and dramatic reductions in interest rates
resulting in thousands of dollars of savings in a matter of months. 14 Instead,
after collecting its fees in advance, debt negotiation services merely "show" the
consumer savings in the form of accelerated payment schedules based on assumed interest rates and increased monthly payments. 5
Although the lines between the various models may sometimes be
blurred, and some companies may offer debt management, debt settlement, and
other services, this Note is exclusively concerned with solutions to the particular
problems posed by the debt settlement industry.
9
Letter from the Nat'1 Ass'n of Attorneys Gen. to the Sec'y of the Fed. Trade Comm'n 2
(Oct. 23, 2009) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/543670-00192.pdf
[hereinafter NAAG Letter].
10

Id.

I'

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id. at 3.

14

Id.

15

NAAG Letter, supra note 9, at 3-4.
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The Debt Settlement Model

B.

It is difficult to develop a value-neutral description of the debt settlement model, which has been called both a lifesaverl 6 and "inherently harmful to
consumers." 7 Additionally, not all companies follow the same model; they
differ in eligibility requirements, fee structures, services rendered, and other
policies. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw together a number of common elements and practices to create an industry model that suffices for the purposes of
general identification.' 8
Debt settlement providers typically rely on consumers to make first contact with the company. Providers make no attempt to identify consumers in
need of the services or to procure lists of individuals at particular debt levels.
This is done in large part in order to avoid falling under the jurisdiction of state
and federal telemarketing regulations that typically apply only when a marketer
calls a consumer, not vice-versa.19 Thus, in recent years, debt settlement companies have ramped up advertising efforts, particularly through syndicated and
satellite radio networks.20 These ads, while touting the potential benefits of their
debt settlement solution and promoting enthusiastic endorsements from satisfied
customers, typically provide very little substantive information about the programs and instead encourage consumers to call a toll-free number or visit a
website for more information.2 ' Over the phone, the agencies will determine
whether consumers qualify for the program; if so, the two sides will enter into a
contract setting forth the terms of the arrangement, usually conferring certain
legal powers on the company.2 2
Most debt settlement companies have a minimum debt requirement.2 3
These debt requirements can be as low as $5000 or as high as $10,000 in unse16

Testimonials, DEBT

17

NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, AN INVESTIGATION OF DEBT SETTLEMENT COMPANIES:

http://www.debtsettlementusa.com/testimonials
.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 2010) ("You saved my life!").
SETTLEMENT

USA,

AN UNSETTLING BUSINESS FOR CONSUMERS 1 (2005) [hereinafter NCLC REPORT].

1

Numerous reports (NCLC, The Association of Settlement Companies) have purported to
give a general description of the debt settlement model. In nearly all cases, these reports are underwritten by either industry or consumer-advocacy groups and may reflect the expected biases of
such organizations. For the purposes of this section, I have attempted to distill the common elements of these reports.
W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-6F-101 to -703; 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2009). Under new FTC debt settle'9
ment rules, however, many inbound calls from consumers now come under the scope of the federal regulation. See infra Part II.F.
20
David Stretfield, The Debt Settlement Industry is Busy, but It's a Bit Nervous Too, N.Y.
TIMES, Jun. 9, 2009 ("The most successful ads. . . emphasize words like 'stress' and 'anxiety' and
showcase notions like the inability to sleep or frequent fights with a spouse.").
21
See, e.g., qldata, Debt Help Center USA TV Commercial, YOuTUBE (Sept. 28, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-h4hHhuqGqrE.
22
NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 2.
23

Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 12

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

216

[Vol. 113

cured debt. 24 When an individual owes money to multiple creditors, some companies also set creditor minimums, usually around $1000, for each individual
creditor.25
The central element of the debt settlement model is the creation of a
"reserve" account, from which any future settlement will be paid. Some companies will create a savings account for consumers.26 Others merely require
proof that such an account has been set up by the consumer.27 In either case, the
company often requires the consumer to grant the company access to the account so that fees can be withdrawn directly.28
Once the account is established, the consumer begins making monthly
deposits. There is some controversy over whether or not consumers are explicitly told to stop paying their creditors at this time, but because most consumers
enter into debt-settlement plans for the very reason that they are already unable
to pay their monthly bills, it is unlikely that very many individuals are capable
of making simultaneous payments to a reserve account and to their creditors.29
Regardless of whether or not the consumer stops making payments to his creditors, little action is likely to take place for several months or longer, possibly
several years.30
The primary tactic of the debt settlement negotiator is convincing the
creditor that, after a long period of no payment and no contact, some income is
better than none. 3 1 The success of this strategy depends on manipulating the
consumer's delinquency and rate of savings such that they coincide with a creditor's or debt collector's incentive to settle. 3 2 Generally, the chances for a favorable settlement increase as the creditors approach their self-imposed "chargeoff' deadlines, at which point (usually after six to twelve months of delinquency) the debt is no longer listed as an account receivable, and its value is charged
against the creditor's reserve for losses.3 3 If the debt settlement company gets
the timing right, a creditor may be willing to take what it can get. Of course,
this is not always the case, as many companies simply sell "charged-off' debt to
Id. "Unsecured debt" is debt that is backed only by the creditworthiness of the debtor and
not by any collateral security.
25
To Qualify, DEBT SETTLEMENT USA, http://www.debtsettlementusa.com/default.aspx (last
visited Sept. 9, 2010).
26
NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 2.
24

27
28
29

Id.
Id.
See infra Part II.D.4 for a discussion of the controversy surrounding debt settlement compa-

nies' advice regarding payment of creditors.
30

THE ASSOCIATION OF DEBT SETTLEMENT COMPANIES, PRELIMINARY STUDY 7 (2008) [hereinafter TASC STUDY].
31
NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 9.
32
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 74 Fed. Reg. 41987, 41993 (Aug. 19, 2009) [hereinafter
TSR Notice].
33

ROBERT J. HOBBS ET AL., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 14-15 (6th ed. 2008).
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third-party debt buyers, beginning the process (and for the consumer, the harassment) anew.34
For the duration of this waiting game, the debt settlement company continues to automatically withdraw fees from the reserve account.35 The majority
of companies charge an up-front fee that may exceed $1000 in addition to
monthly fees that are typically assessed on a per-account basis.36 To earn these
fees, companies purport to offer a litany of services to the consumer, including
performing the steps required to determine initial qualification; placing monthly
calls to the consumer to give updated status reports, answering questions, and
providing ongoing customer support; advising and helping stop collection calls
and harassment; conducting "[o]ngoing written and/or telephonic negotiation
between the client and the creditor for each account;" and other services.3 7
If and when a settlement is reached, the company will withdraw a final
fee, usually in proportion to the amount of money "saved" through negotiation.
Because debts are typically settled one account at a time, and as mentioned,
each account may take months to settle, it is not uncommon for an individual to
take many years to complete an entire debt settlement "program" that involves
debts owed to more than one creditor.
C.

History and Growth

The modem debt settlement industry traces its roots to the commercial
"debt adjusters," "debt poolers," and "debt pro-raters" of the first half of the
twentieth century. In the absence of regulation, such companies prospered, but
abuses were rampant-fees were high, companies often paid themselves before
paying creditors, little actual guidance was provided, and some adjusters simply

In order to limit their losses, many credit card companies in possession of great amounts of
unsecured debt choose to liquidate lost accounts. Non-performing accounts are packaged and sold
in bulk, for pennies on the dollar, to third-party debt collection agencies that can tum a profit by
collecting on only a small percentage of the accounts purchased. As a result of this process, it is
not uncommon for a single account to be assigned to as many as eight collection agencies. See
TASC STUDY, supra note 30, at 6-7 (providing a table that monitors accounts through the collection process noting several occasions on which "one account passes through several collection
agencies which requires the debt settlement company to initiate dialogue on multiple occasions
from the same account").
3s
NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 7-8.
36
NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 7-9; NAAG Letter, supra note 9, at 6.
34

3
TASC STUDY, supra note 30, at 4-5. See also infra Part II.D.3 for a discussion of common
complaints about the inadequacy of such alleged services.
3
TASC STUDY, supra note 30, at 7; NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 4.
39
Christopher H. Schmidt, Heather Timmons & John Cady, A Debt Trapfor the Unwary, Bus.
WK. Oct. 9, 2001, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_44/b3755094.htm, cited in
Carla Stone Witzel, The New Uniform Debt Management Services Act, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q.
REP. 650 (2006).
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disappeared with consumers' funds.40 In far too many instances, consumers
who had trouble making ends meet before going to a debt adjuster found themselves in even worse financial shape afterward. 4 1 By the 1970s, in response to
growing concern over the proliferation of unscrupulous practices, most states
had banned for-profit credit counseling, and many others adopted regulatory
schemes that required licensing and bonding while imposing maximum fees and
other requirements.4 2
But the demand for some form of consumer debt relief did not disappear, particularly as the late 1970s and early 1980s marked the beginning of an
upward surge in consumer debt. 4 3 As a result, the debt adjusting industry reinvented itself as the non-profit "credit counseling" industry, led by the National
Foundation for Consumer Credit (NFCC), an association of local retailers and
banks that issued credit cards.44 States assumed that, without a profit motive,
these non-profit counselors could more effectively educate and advise consumers and could be trusted not to repeat many of the harmful and deceptive practices of their commercial, for-profit predecessors.4 5 Unfortunately, this was not
an ideal solution. Many critics charged that while the debtors who relied on
these organizations believed they were getting disinterested advice, in practice,
most of the organizations exhibited a clear pro-creditor bias.46 Although certain
abuses disappeared, some non-profit credit counselors continued to harm consumers, and concern over such practices prompted statutory efforts to counter
such abuses.47
Beginning in the 1990s, nationalized credit card issuers, relaxed lending
standards, and an increase in consumer income gave rise to a dramatic increase
in credit card debt. This in turn led to an increase in the amount of debt in de-

Carl Felsenfeld, Consumer Credit Counseling, 26 Bus. LAW. 925, 928 (1971) cited in Carla
Stone Witzel, The New Uniform Debt Management Services Act, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP.
650 (2006).
41
Felsenfeld, supra note 40.
42
Id. at 928-29.

40

Consumer
Credit
Historical
Data,
THE
FED.
RESERVE,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/hist/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2010); Saj Karsan, Consumer
Debt
Levels:
A
Historical
Perspective,
SEEKING
ALPHA,
(last vihttp://seekingalpha.com/article/156161-consumer-debt-levels-an-historical-perspective
sited Sept. 9, 2010).
4
Leslie Linfield, Uniform Debt Management Services Act: Regulating Two Related-Yet
Distinct-Industries,28-APR AM. BANKR. INST. J. 50, 51 (2009).
45
Witzel, supra note 39, at 651. The problem with this method is that the profit/non-profit
distinction is based on an IRS determination that is in no way based on any assessment of the
company's character, motive, or judgment.
46
Abby S. Milstein & Bruce C. Ratner, Consumer Credit Counseling Service: A Consumer
Oriented View, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 978, 988 (1981), cited in Witzel, supra note 39, at 652.
4

47

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, THE UNIFORM DEBT

MANAGEMENT SERVICES ACT-SUMMARY

2-3 (2008), availableat http://www.udmsa.org.
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fault and a renewed need for consumers to seek debt relief.48 The "third generation" of credit counseling agencies was thus born, taking advantage of new
technology and marketing techniques by utilizing toll-free 800 numbers and the
Internet. 4 9 Unlike their NFCC predecessors, which had been organized and operated around regional interests, many of the new debt relief agencies became
multi-state providers operated across a wide range of jurisdictions and regulatory schemes, creating a whole new set of headaches for state Attorneys General
attempting to ensure that such agencies complied with all relevant state laws.s0
At best, multi-state providers were simply unable to stay abreast of changes in
state laws and to adapt their practices in order to stay in compliance. At worst,
national debt relief companies brazenly ignored unfavorable state laws and were
frequently able to dodge enforcement by sheer volume while incorporating and
sheltering their businesses in jurisdictions whose laws were more favorable.5
The full-fledged debt settlement industry began to take shape in the early 2000s. After decades in exile, shades of the original debt adjusters could be
seen in this new wave of (mostly) for-profit companies that aim not to help consumers manage and pay their debts in full, but rather to convince creditors to
settle large accounts for less than they are owed.52 Already booming, the debt
settlement industry was indirectly boosted by the 2005 amendments to the bankruptcy code (BAPCPA), which required individuals filing for bankruptcy to
seek the assistance of approved credit counseling agencies (including agencies
that also offer debt settlement services).53 As the American economy continues
to struggle, and as struggling consumers look for solutions to their debt problems (especially when such solutions appear too good to be true), demand for
the type of services offered by the latest generation of debt settlement companies will no doubt continue to rise.
D.

Common Abuses in the Debt Settlement Industry

Despite decades of attempts to reform and regulate, the debt settlement
industry continues to be a major problem area for both consumers and the various agencies tasked with protecting them. While industry trade groups maintain
that the real problems lie with only a few rogue companies that do not represent
the industry as a whole, 54 consumer advocacy groups have stopped just short of
condemning the entire industry. 5
48

49
so

Linfield, supra note 44, at 51.
Id.
Id.

See id.
Id.
5
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
54
TASC STUDY, supra note 30. But see Peter S. Goodman, PeddlingRelief Firms Put Debtors in Deeper Hole, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/19/business/
51
52
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In 2005, the United States Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a scathing report entitled Profiteeringin a Non-Profit Industry:
Abusive Practicesin Credit Counseling6 and in 2008, the Better Business Bureau included "Illegitimate Credit Repair & Debt Negotiation Services" among
its annual list of the "Top Ten Scams That Stole People's Money."5 In the past
five years, twenty-one states have brought more than 128 enforcement actions
against eighty-four debt settlement companies, and since 2001, the Federal
Trade Commission has brought seven major suits against debt settlement companies for a variety of consumer abuses.59 As the economy lags and unscrupulous companies prey upon hopeless Americans buried in debt, complaints of
such abuse are on the rise and have been reported with increasing frequency by
a number of leading media sources. 60 The potential for such abuses begins with
the marketing and advertising of debt settlement services, but problems frequently arise regarding fees, failure to provide promised services, damage to
consumers' credit rating, and even whether or not debt settlement plans are fundamentally sound for the very consumers to which they are marketed.
1.

Debt Settlement Providers Frequently Use Misleading and Deceptive Marketing Techniques

As illustrated by Roger's story, the initial point of contact between consumers and debt settlement providers is typically through Internet, television, or
radio advertising.62 It is becoming increasingly common for such advertising to
be produced by "leads generators," who are not themselves debt settlement providers.6 3 Typically, these ads encourage the consumer to call a "counselor" at a

economy/19debt.html (in which the CEO of U.S. Debt Resolve, a debt settlement firm based in
Dallas, Texas, portrays his company as a "rare island of integrity in a sea of shady competitors"
who operate "almost as a Ponzi scheme").
5
NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 1 (characterizing the debt settlement model as "inherently
harmful to consumers"); NAAG Letter, supra note 9, at 4.
56
See generally U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITrEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, PROFITEERING
IN A NON-PROFIT INDUSTRY: ABUSIVE PRACTICES IN CREDIT COUNSELING, S. Hrg. 108-545, at 203.
s7
Better Business Bureau, BBB Announces Top 10 Scams of 2008 (Jan. 21, 2009),
http://chicago.bbb.org/article/bbb-reports-on-top- 10-scams-that-stole-peoples-money-in-20088492.
ss
NAAG Letter, supra note 9, at 5.
59
TSR Notice, supra note 32, at 41996.
60
See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 54; Eleanor Laise, Debt Relief Firms Attract Complaints,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2008, at D1; Francine Knowles, Debt Settlement is No Cure, CHICAGO SUNTIMES, Jan. 28, 2010.

TSR Notice, supra note 32, at 41995.
Id
63
Transcript of Federal Trade Commission Workshop: Consumer Protection and Debt Settlement Industry, Sept. 25, 2008, Panel 3: Protecting the Consumer-A Discussion of Consumer
61
62
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toll-free number for more information.6 By encouraging consumers to contact
providers directly, debt settlement companies and leads generators are able to
avoid certain state and federal telemarketing regulations that apply only to outgoing sales calls. Advertisements for debt settlement services are a common
source of consumer complaints of fraud, deceit, and/or misrepresentation. Most
debt settlement advertisements are intentionally vague and contain limited or no
details about the actual substance of the services provided. 66 There is no mention that creditors may not be paid for many months, or even years, nor do most
ads disclose that the consumer must open a savings account with, or turn over
67
control of their own accounts to, the debt settlement company.
Practically
without exception, these advertisements make grand claims about the results
they can reach for consumers struggling with debt-a reduction of debt by 50%;
elimination of debt in twelve to thirty-six months; immediate and permanent
cessation of harassing phone calls from creditors and debt collectors; and "expert assistance from debt settlement providers who have special relationships
with creditors and knowledge" of "insider secrets."6 For the most part, such
claims are not supported, even by the industry's own data.
Rarely, if ever, do advertisements make even the most cursory mention
of the many potential problems associated with debt settlement. 70 Most imply,
if not explicitly promise, a high likelihood of success. Some companies even go
so far as to guarantee success, describing their programs as "no risk."7 As discussed below, however, debt settlement plans are extremely risky for most con-

Protection Challenges at 150, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/debtsettlement/
OfficialTranscript.pdf.
6
FTC v. Debt-set, Inc., No 1:07-CV-00558-RPM (D. Colo. 2007).
65
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2009). However, a series of 2010 amendments
to the TSR bring many inbound calls from consumers under the scope of the federal regulation.
See infra Part II.F.
66
TSR Notice, supra note 32, at 41995.
67
Id. at 41995-96.
6
Id. at 41995.
69
See generally TASC STUDY, supra note 30. The study, based on voluntary participation
from TASC members, reported common completion percentages as low as 35%. Additionally, the
report's probative value is diminished by numerous methodological infirmities, including the
failure to report on which and how many members of the association participated in the study, and
the use of a floating definition for "completion." While some participants considered a program
completed only when all accounts had been settled, others defined completion as the settlement of
a single account, regardless of how many additional outstanding accounts the consumer might
have with the provider. For more criticism of the TASC Preliminary Study, see NAAG Letter,
supra note 9, at 8, and TSR Notice, supra note 32, at 41995 n.104.
70
TSR Notice, supra note 32, at 41995.
71
See, e.g., FTC v. Innovative Sys. Tech. Inc., No. CVO4-0728 GAF JTLx (C.D. Cal. 2004)
(showing that the defendant believed enrollment in debt settlement plan posed "no risk" because it
guaranteed that its services would produce the promised results).
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sumers, and in particular, for those consumers specifically targeted by debt settlement advertisements.
Finally, most advertisements for debt settlement services fail to provide
72
To the extent
any information regarding fees or other costs of the program.
that any such statement is made, it usually takes the form of eye-catching inducements, such as "free online evaluation" or "free consultation." The real
fees-substantial ones that a consumer must consider before deciding whether a
debt settlement plan makes financial sense-are not discussed until the consumer initiates contact over the phone, or in some cases, not until the consumer
receives a written contract.74
2.

Debt Settlement Companies Often Charge Exorbitant and Undeserved Fees 7 5

It is not only the advertising--or lack thereof-of debt settlement fees
that harm consumers, but also the fees themselves. 76 Exorbitant fees are one of
the primary reasons why consumers rarely benefit from debt settlement plans.
Consumers who seek out debt settlement services are typically those who have
only a small amount of money left over each month after necessary expenses.
In order to stay on their feet, these consumers must struggle to make the most
out of their available funds. Perversely, the debt settlement companies to whom
such consumers turn for help often gouge their clients with expensive up-front
and maintenance fees so that the funds in consumers' "reserve" accounts build
slowly, if at all.77
Industry surveys reveal three prevalent fee structures in the debt settlement industry.7 8 In the "front end model," companies generally require consumers to pay as much as 40% of the total fee within the first few months of
enrollment, collecting the balance over the lifetime of the program.79 In this
72

TSR Notice, supra note 32, at 41994-5.

73

Id. at 41995.

74

Id.

Days before this Note was published, new Federal Trade Commission rules addressing the
debt settlement industry went into effect. Among many provisions, a new rule prohibits debtsettlement companies that do business over the telephone from assessing up-front fees (discussed
below). There is reason to believe, however, that the new FTC rules do not signal the end of upfront fees in the industry as many companies may simply adapt their models to make use of the
Internet, face-to-face transactions, or other means not covered by the rules. For further discussion,
see infra Part II.
76
NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 7.
7

n

Id.

TSR Notice, supra note 32, at 41994.
Id.; see also FTC v. Connelly, No. SA CV 06-701 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (in which defendants
required customers to make a "down payment" of 30% to 40% of the total fee in the first two or
three months with the remainder paid over the following year).
7
7

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss1/12

14

Donovan: The Problem With the Solution: Why West Virginians Shouldn't "Set

THE PROBLEM WITH THE SOLUTION

2010]

223

model, consumers may be expected to pay hundreds of dollars to their debt settlement provider before creditors are even contacted.80 A second common practice is the "flat fee" model, in which consumers pay a lump sum early in the
program.81 Finally, agencies using the "back end" model collect a small
monthly fee for the duration of the program, as well as a percentage of the total
amount saved if and when a settlement is finally reached. 8 2 "Back end" fees are
disturbing because, unlike an attorney's share of damages, the money "saved" in
debt settlement is an ephemeral sum that the consumer never truly had in the
first place. The worst debt settlement providers combine the elements of the
"front end" and "back end" models, assessing high up-front fees, monthly
83
charges, and also taking a cut from the final settlement.
Most companies are not forthcoming with information about their fee
structures, and as discussed above, it is difficult if not impossible to glean such
information from most companies' advertisements. 84 Nonetheless, in 2005, the
National Consumer Law Center conducted a study that gathered data from debt
settlement contracts, phone calls to companies, and information from company
websites. The data collected reflects fees that are "not only unreasonable and
unaffordable for many consumers, but also take away valuable resources the
consumer could use to actually repay the debts." 86 In one instance, a company
charged an up-front fee of $300 per month for the first three months and "administrative fees" of $112 per month for the remainder of the program in addition to collecting 15% of the total amount "saved" through settlement.8 7 Another company charged a monthly administrative fee in addition to 25% of the settlement savings and refused to give refunds to consumers who withdrew from
Astonishingly, the provider
the program before any services were rendered.
charged the 25% fee even if consumers settled the debt on their own, so long as
consumers were enrolled in the program. 89
Reports of outrageous fees have also emerged as debt settlement companies are forced to reveal their practices in court pleadings. In one such case, a
company charged consumers an up-front fee of 3.5% of their outstanding credit

80

TSR Notice, supra note 32, at 41994.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83
State ex rel. McGraw v. Patriot Debt Solutions Corp., C.A. No. 07-Misc-309 (Kanawha
Cnty. Cir. Ct. 2007).
84
See supra Part II.D. 1 for a discussion of abuses in the marketing of debt settlement services.
85

NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 7.

86

Id.

87
88

Id. at 8.

89

Id.

Id.
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card debt or $500, whichever was higher. 90 The provider also collected a
monthly fee of $45 (plus $3 for each additional account), and 25% of the money
saved through settlement.9' The company even charged a $10 "check handling"
fee, and all payments and fees were automatically deducted from the consumer's checking account. 92
3.

Debt Settlement Companies Fail to Provide Valuable Services

Fees as high as the ones above create self-perpetuating problems for
consumers, because depleting clients' funds hinders the ability of individuals to
solve their debt problems. But in some cases, high fees could be appropriate if
actual, effective services were rendered. Unfortunately, it is all too often the
case that debt settlement companies do very little to earn the fees they charge
consumers.
Debt settlement companies typically promise to provide a wide range of
services from employing "insider knowledge" to negotiate settlements to stopping harassing phone calls to improving consumers' credit scores. 93 In emphatic
apologetics responding directly to criticisms from consumer advocacy agencies,
industry trade groups have claimed that high, up-front fees are necessary to cover the costs of typical activities involved in executing a debt settlement plan,
including interacting and communicating with new clients, evaluating clients'
financial circumstances, mailing or otherwise transmitting documents and
agreements to clients, entering client information into databases, providing periodic reports to clients, and interacting and negotiating with creditors on behalf
of clients.94 Many consumer advocates are skeptical that the costs associated
with such minimal activities justify the rates of most debt settlement plans.9 5
In some cases, debt settlement companies simply do not deliver on explicit promises.96 Creditors are never contacted, and collection calls never
stop. 97 Calls from consumers are not answered, and even when consumers are
summoned into court, the debt settlement providers remain silent. 9 8 Often, con90

ROBB

EVANS,

REPORT

OF

TEMPORARY

RECEIVER'S

ACTIVITIES,

www.robbevans.com/pdf/nccincreport01.pdf [hereinafter RECEIVER'S
91
Id.
92

available at

REPORT].

Id.

NAAG Letter, supra note 9, at 3.
94
TASC STUDY, supra note 30, at 4-5.
95
See generally NCLC REPORT, supra note 17.
96
NAAG Letter, supra note 9, at 6 (reprinting a 2002 letter from an Illinois consumer, who
reported that "[the debt settlement company] kept $6,500 for the settlement of three accounts
9

which they didn't settle .

. .

. They did not get in touch with the credit card companies and we

were called from 8 a.m. to 9 p.m. every day . ... They didn't even help us when we received the
summons. We are retired and on a fixed income. Please do what you can for us.").
97

Id.

98

Id
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sumers feel compelled to remain in a plan even when services are not provided
as promised, because the fees they have paid are non-refundable.99
Even when the promised services are performed, they can usually be
performed by the consumer himself at little or no cost and with no particular
expertise. Many creditors are willing to negotiate directly with debtors.100 The
primary tactic of the debt settlement professional is to simply "wait out" the
creditor, which is an action easily accomplished by even the least sophisticated
consumers.'0 o Likewise, most consumers are capable of composing and mailing
to debt collectors their own "cease communication" letter, which is just as effective as any effort taken by a debt settlement company. 102 Finally, free educational materials about personal finances and debt management are available
online from a variety of credible consumer advocacy groups.103
Insight into the actual value of the services allegedly performed by debt
settlement companies can be gained by examining one of the rare published
judicial decisions against a debt settlement company. 104 In In re Sinnot, the Supreme Court of Vermont found that the evidence supported a panel's conclusion
that the fees charged by a debt settlement law firm "had nothing to do with work
performed and that the work performed had no value to the client."o The firm
never initiated negotiations with the client's creditor, a major credit card company, and in the three to four hours it actually spent on the client's case, the firm
performed nothing more than "automated" or "routine" tasks. 10 6 In the end, the
client himself negotiated his own settlement with the credit card company.107

9

Id. at 7.
100 Transcript of Federal Trade Commission Workshop: Consumer Protection and Debt Settlement Industry, Sep. 25, 2008, comments of Anna Flores, Vice President of Consumer Affairs with
at
available
142,
at
Express
American
http://www.ftc.govibcp/workshops/debtsettlement/index.shtm.
101 See supra Part II.B for description of the debt settlement business model.
102
Such sample letters are available online and through the mail from a number of consumer
advocacy and debt awareness groups. In fact, the NCLC reports that many debt settlement companies merely send consumers a sample letter to fill out on their own.
103 See, e.g., Facts for Consumers: Knee Deep in Debt, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/crel9.shtm (last visited Sept. 8, 2010); WEST
VIRGINIA ATTORNEY GENERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION AND ANTI-TRUST DivisION HOME PAGE,
http://www.wvago.gov/consumers.cfm (last visited on Sept. 8, 2010).
'
See In re Sinnot, 845 A.2d 373 (Vt. 2004).
105 Id. at 378.
106

Id.

107

Id.
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Debt Settlement Requires Consumers to Stop Paying Their
Creditors, Resulting in Irreparable Damage to the Consumers'
Credit Ratings

State Attorneys General have discovered that, thanks to the advertising
and marketing efforts of the debt settlement industry, many consumers believe
that debt settlement is a safe, low-risk alternative to bankruptcy.108 Unfortunately, although consumers turn to debt settlement as a solution to their debt problems, most find that they emerge from the programs with worse credit than before. This is because most debt settlement plans call for consumers to stop paying their creditors in order to strengthen the position of the negotiator. 109 Many
companies explicitly warn clients not to make payments on their debts.' 10 Other
companies merely imply that consumers should stop paying their creditors and
provide information about the debt settlement process emphasizing the strategic
benefits of non-payment."' Rarely do debt settlement companies provide adequate disclosures or true assistance in handling the consequences of their preferred strategy.1 12
Yet the consequences of such actions are dire. Failure to pay debts,
even as part of a debt settlement program, exposes consumers to growing debt,
deteriorating credit scores, collection actions, civil liability, and even wage garnishment." 3 Though debt settlement providers often trumpet their ability to
stop collection calls, many simply do not follow through.' 14 What consumers
are not often told is that not all calls can be stopped-the federal fair debt collection laws apply only to third-party debt collectors; a creditor attempting to
collect on its own accounts need not comply with a cease collection request.,
Even when calls can be stopped, creditors are still free to bring lawsuits against
debtors.

109

NAAG Letter, supra note 9, at 8.
See supra Part II.B for a description of the debt settlement business model.

110

NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 5.

108

I

Id. ("[O]ne company representative told us that they can't tell consumers not to pay creditors, but this is what consumers need to do because the longer they're not paying the creditors, the
better deal they will eventually get from creditors.").
112

Id. at 6.

113

Id.

I14

NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 6.

11s See Fair Debt Collection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2010). Under the FDCPA, a debt
collector is one who attempts to collect "debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another"
Id. (emphasis added).
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Debt Settlement Programs Yield Startlingly Low Success Rates
and Completion Percentages

Misrepresentations, excessive fees, lack of services, and intervening
collection efforts all contribute to perhaps the greatest horror of the debt collection industry: its disturbingly low success rate. 11 6 Although advertisements
promise quick results, low-income consumers required to pay high up-front and
monthly maintenance fees to debt settlement providers can take years to set
aside enough money for a full settlement of all their accounts." 7 In the meantime, consumers continue to face unsettling collection tactics, compounding fees
and interest, and a worsening credit rating."' 8 The net result is that very few
consumers have the financial wherewithal or emotional stamina to complete a
debt settlement program.
One debt settlement provider admitted that the average "break-even
point" was at least three months, and that creditors are generally not willing to
even consider settlement until at least six months of delinquency." 9 Employees
of the same company admitted that the process was a "fire walk" for consumers
that could last more than three years.12 0 As a result, only 1.4% of consumers
who entered the program actually completed it.12'
Although industry-wide figures are difficult to nail down, these results
are hardly unique.12 2 In a number of noteworthy cases, debt settlement companies have been unable to substantiate their claims about the likelihood of success. In a case from Texas, the Attorney General alleges that more than 80% of
the debts serviced by a debt settlement company were not settled.12 3 In a Mary116

NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 4; NAAG Letter, supra note 9, at 7; TASC STUDY, supra

note 30, at 1.
"

NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 4-5.

11

Id. at 4.
RECEIVER'S REPORT, supra note 90. The "break-even point" is the point at which enough

119

funds have been deposited to the reserve account to pay off the initial set-up fee and accumulated
maintenance fees so that a consumer can begin saving money that will actually go toward settlement.
120

Id. at 13.

121

Id.
The NAAG describes the difficulty of obtaining useful statistics on debt settlement complerates:
tion
Excuses offered by settlement agencies are either that such data does not exist
or that the debt settlement industry is a relatively new industry and has not yet
had time to accumulate sufficient and reliable data concerning success rates.
This raises a separate concern, which is that if the settlement industry lacks reliable data to substantiate its advertised success rates, then why are these
claims being made?
NAAG Letter, supra note 9, at 7-8 n. 10.
123 NAAG Letter, supra note 9, at 7 (citing State of Texas v. CSA-Credit Solutions of Am.,
Inc., Cause No. D-1-GV-09-000417, 261st District Court, Travis County).
122
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land action, a company was unable to substantiate its advertised claim that it
could reduce consumers' debts by up to 70%. 124 Compounding the problem is
that when debt settlement plans fail, companies are usually loath to provide consumers with adequate refunds,125 a particularly slimy policy, given what is
known about what services are actually rendered prior to negotiations with creditors. 126

Responding to these charges, The Association of Settlement Companies
(TASC), a debt settlement industry trade group, released a "preliminary study"
purporting to show average completion rates between 45% and 50%. 127 Such a
rate would exceed reported success rates for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and certain
types of credit counseling and debt management plans, making debt settlement a
more viable option.128 However, consumer advocates are skeptical about the
validity of the TASC report. The NAAG pointed out, for example, that the report was labeled "[p]reliminary" with no final report forthcoming; that the report does not reveal TASC's methods for conducting the survey, nor what percentage of the industry was represented in the study; and that some of the participants in the study considered a program completed when in reality only 50% to
80% of the consumers' debts were actually settled. 12 9 Regardless of the industry
average, it is clear that in a great many cases, for a variety of reasons, consumers' chances of successfully navigating a debt settlement program are slim.
6.

Debt Settlement Companies Fail to Provide Consumers with
Critical Information About Bankruptcy Options and the Tax
Implications of Debt Settlement Programs

Debt settlement companies also frequently fail to provide consumers
with adequate information related to two key considerations that should affect a
consumer's decision about whether or not to enter into a debt settlement plan in
the first place: the consumer's bankruptcy options and the potential tax implications of settling a debt for less than is owed.
Debt settlement companies advertise themselves as an alternative to
bankruptcy. They appeal to a consumer's innate sense of pride and obligation,
often featuring testimonials from customers who talk about how great it felt to
124
See Press Release, Maryland Attorney General, Attorney General Settles with Companies
Selling
Debt
Repayment
Services
(Oct.
19,
2007),
available
at
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Press/2007/101907.htm.
125
NAAG Letter, supra note 9, at 7 (reprinting a letter from a Missouri consumer who complained that "After paying in excess of $3,000, creditors still were calling . . . My account is currently cancelled and I am seeking a full refund. They are offering 30%, saying they have performed work on the account, and the issues with the creditor calls was [sic] my fault.").
126
See supra Part II.D.3 for a discussion of failure to provide valuable services.
127
TASC STUDY, supra note 30, at 1.
128
Id.
129

NAAG Letter, supra note 9, at 8.
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be able to make good on their financial promises.13 For many consumers, however, bankruptcy might be a better option than debt settlement, particularly if the
consumer is predictably unlikely to be able to complete a sustained debt settlement program. Bankruptcy proceedings typically cost a consumer no more than
$1500, and may result in a preferable arrangement for both debtor and creditor.13 1
Regardless, few, if any, debt settlement companies adequately advise
potential customers about their bankruptcy options. To do so would certainly be
bad for business. Arguably, it may not be appropriate for debt settlement companies to make such assessments as it may constitute the unlicensed practice of
law in many jurisdictions.132 In any case, it is not possible for a consumer to
make a fully-informed choice about whether or not to enter into a debt settlement program without at least considering the possibility of bankruptcy.
If some consumers are at least aware of the possibility of bankruptcy, it
is far less likely that the average potential debt settlement consumer (or the average attorney, for that matter) is aware of the potential tax consequences of
settling a debt for less than is owed. The debt settlement companies know, but
rarely warn consumers ahead of time. Instead, if and when a settlement is actually reached, the consumer will simply receive a 1099-C Cancellation of Debt
notice form from the IRS, explaining that money saved in settlement must be
reported to the IRS as income.133 In many cases, this additional tax burden, had
it been known up-front, might have led a rational consumer toward a different
debt relief solution.
E.

The GAO Sting

In 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded an
extensive investigation of the debt settlement industry.13 4 Responding to complaints about debt settlement providers from numerous state and federal agencies, the GAO set forth to determine whether the allegations were accurate and,
if so, whether the allegations were widespread. To answer these questions,
130
1'

Testimonials, supra note 16.
Various bankruptcy options are available to consumers under Title 11 of the United States

Code.
132
See infra Part III.B.2.c for a discussion of the application of rules and statutes regulating the
unlicensed practice of law to the debt settlement industry.
133 Form 1099-C is a form created by the Internal Revenue Service used to prepare and file an
"information return" to report various types of income other than wages, salaries, and tips (for
which the usual form W-2 is used instead). While there are numerous varieties of 1099 obligations, form 1099-C applies specifically to income derived from the cancellation of outstanding

debt.

Forms and

Publications, INTERNAL

REVENUE

SERVICE,

http://www.irs.gov/

formspubs/index.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2010).
134

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEBT SETiLEMENT: FRAUDULENT,

ABUSIVE, AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES POSE RISK TO CONSUMERS

(2010) [hereinafter GAO

INVESTIGATION].
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GAO agents conducted covert testing by calling debt settlement providers while
posing as consumers with large amounts of debt; making overt and unannounced site visits to the companies called; conducting interviews with industry
insiders; and reviewing information about federal and state legal actions against
debt settlement providers. 13 5 The investigation ultimately uncovered clear and
abundant evidence of fraudulent, deceptive, and abusive practices such as those
described above.136
GAO agents posing as embattled consumers found that debt settlement
providers were eager to make promises that simply cannot be kept. One company promised that the "worst case scenario" for debt settlement would be "40
cents on the dollar," and that 100% of the company's clients get out of debt in
three years or less.137 It also assured that "every single creditor settles. There's
not one creditor we haven't been able to reach a settlement with." 3 Other
companies promised to stop calls from creditors "immediately," eliminate late
fees, or even pay consumers $100 if the company could not settle their debt
within twenty-four hours.1 39 Many companies also lied about their credentials
and the very nature of their existence. They claimed to be "licensed and regulated by TASC" (a nonprofit trade association with no licensing or regulatory
authority), displayed Better Business Bureau (BBB) insignia (the BBB recently
designated the debt settlement industry as "inherently problematic"), and
claimed links to fictitious "government authorized" programs like the "National
Debt Relief Stimulus Plan."1 4 0 Several companies were not debt settlement providers at all, but rather marketing sites or leads generators.141 Most brashly, one
company specifically targeted Christians by employing a biblical marketing
theme and promising consumers that funds from their debt settlement services
went toward a related non-profit ministry.142 When asked to produce an IRS
Form 990 for the non-profit side of the operation, the owner preached: "the Bible says you should never let the left hand know what the right hand is

doing."1 4 3
The investigation also confirmed widespread complaints of excessive
and undeserved fees. Of the eighteen companies from which fee information
was obtained, seventeen collected advance fees before debts were settled. 144 In
addition to up-front costs, several companies admitted that as many as four
135
136

Id. at 2.

1"

GAO INVESTIGATION, supra note 134, at 16.

138

Id.

3
140

Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 14-18.

141
142

Id.
Id.

143

GAO INVESTIGATION, supra note 134, at 19-20.

'"

Id. at 7.

Id.at 7.

at 16-17.
at 19.
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monthly payments would go directly to fees before any money at all would be
deposited to the settlement account. 14 5 At least one company had difficulty explaining what services were rendered in return for these fees. 146 Because GAO
agents did not actually enter into business relationships with the target companies, they were unable to verify the extent and nature of ongoing services provided. Even their promises, however, were underwhelming: little more than
forms for cease and desist letters, automated emails, and online links to basic
educational materials.147
Despite industry claims to the contrary, the GAO also concluded that an
alarming number of debt settlement companies put consumers at risk by advising them to stop making payments to their creditors.1 48 Representatives of seventeen out of twenty companies either required GAO agents to stop paying
creditors as a precondition to entering their programs or informed them that
cessation of payment was necessary for the program to work.149 Though TASC
and other industry advocates assert that companies do not explicitly advise consumers to stop paying their creditors, company representatives make the requirement abundantly clear. "I won't tell anyone not to pay their bills," claimed
one representative. "I [say] one-hundred percent of the clients who have been
successful have stopped paying their bills."' 50
Finally, the GAO investigation confirmed allegations that the success
rates claimed by debt settlement companies-as high as 85%, 93%, and 100%
in their survey-do not comport with more realistic and methodologically sound
studies that reveal shockingly low completion and success rates for the industry
as a whole.151 All told, the GAO's investigation of the debt settlement industry
provides clearly documented, first-hand examples of the inherent dangers of
debt settlement.
The New FTC Rules

F.

Just days before this Note was published, new Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rules regarding debt settlement went into effect. After issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and inviting comments and testimony from industry leaders and consumer advocates,152 the FTC finalized a series of amendments to its Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) aimed at limiting many of the

145

Id.

146

Id. at 8.
Id. at 8-9.

147
148

149
150

1
152

Id. at 9.
GAO INVESTIGATION, supra note 134, at 9.

Id
Id. at 10.
TSR Notice, supra note 32.
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abuses outlined above.' 5 3 A detailed examination of the new rules and their
likely effect is beyond the scope of this Note, although generally, they can be
grouped into four parts. The first three parts, effective September 27, 2010,
require certain disclosures,1 54 prohibit certain common misrepresentations, 55
and extend the TSR to cover inbound calls from consumers to debt settlement
agencies.15 6 The fourth part, a ban on advance (or up-front) fees, becomes effective for new transactions on October 27, 2010.157
The amendments to the TSR will no doubt make a significant impact.
Many commentators, however, feel that the new rules do not signal the end of
up-front fees in the debt settlement industry, as many companies may simply
adapt their business model to make use of the Internet, face-to-face transactions,
or other means not covered by the rules.158 Consumer advocates point to the
evolution of the payday lending industry, which has repeatedly re-invented itself
over the years in the wake of state and federal attempts to eradicate it.' 59 Moreover, if the industry itself is to be believed, it will have no choice but to attempt
to skirt the regulations, as its representatives have repeatedly claimed that the
revenue generated by up-front fees is critical to their bottom line.160 For these
reasons, this Note will continue to consider the problems posed by up-front fees
and the best solutions for addressing them.

2010 Amendments to the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48458 (Aug. 10, 2010)
(codified at 16 C.F.R. § 310).
154
16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(1) (2010).
155
16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(2)-(4) (2010).
156 The provisions bringing inbound calls into the scope of the TSR are scattered
throughout 16
C.F.R. § 310 (2010).
1s7
16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(5) (2010).
158 See, e.g., Blake Ellis, New Rules Crack-Down on Deceptive Debt Settlement Practices,
CNN MoNEY (Sept. 27, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/27/pf/debtrules/.
But just as banks have found ways to circumvent new Federal rules on fees,
debt settlement companies may be able to just as easily skirt some of the new
provisions and take advantage of struggling consumers.
Because the debt settlement rules only apply to over-the-phone sales-which
comprise the vast majority of transactions-debt relief companies.can still hit
consumers with fees over the Internet. Face-to-face transactions are also exempt from the rules.
Id.
1s9
In a brief in a case against a payday lender, the West Virginia Attorney General briefly
outlined the history of this evolution, describing "rent-a-bank" schemes and "the artifice of making loans over the Internet via interactive websites." State's Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion to Remand at 5-6, McGraw v. Cashcall, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-0192 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 15,
2008); See also NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE COST OF CREDIT § 7.5.5.8 (4th ed. 2009).
16
Letter from Andrew Housser, The Ass'n of Settlement Companies, to the Sec'y of the Fed.
Trade
Comm'n
16-25
(Oct.
26,
2009),
available
at
http://flc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/543670-00202.pdf; TASC STUDY, supra note 30, at 4-5.
153
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III. Two APPROACHES TO REGULATION OF THE DEBT SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY
A.

The Uniform Debt Management Services Act

By 2005, nearly every state had adopted some type of legislation that either directly or indirectly addressed the debt relief industry.16 1 However, these
laws varied considerably in terms of scope, substance, and enforcement.16 2
Against the backdrop of rapidly growing consumer debt, and the resulting proliferation of debt settlement providers, the NCCUSL began looking into
a uniform solution to problems in the debt relief industry. After an in-depth
review of the state of current debt management and debt settlement regulations,
the NCCUSL's Study Committee on Debt Management proposed the creation of
a Draft Committee on Debt Management. 16 3 In consultation with state commissioners, experts in the field, and industry trade groups, the Draft Committee
promulgated the UDMSA.
Finalized in 2005, the UDMSA has been adopted into law in Nevada,
Utah, Colorado, Tennessee, Delaware, Rhode Island, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.'6 As of 2010, some version of the Act has been formally introduced in
the legislatures of eight other states.' 65 Although the UDMSA has not been formally introduced in West Virginia, it was the subject of a special report to the
Legislature by the West Virginia Commission on Uniform Laws in 2006.166 In
2009, representatives of the NCCUSL once again appeared before a West Virginia Senate subcommittee to urge passage of the Uniform Act.16 7 Although the

161 For a sampling of (non-UDMSA) state laws governing the debt relief industry, see, e.g.,
ARK. CODE § 5-63-301 to -304 (2010); HAw. REV. STAT. § 446-1 to -4 (2010); Ky. REV. STAT. §
380.010 (2010); N.M. STAT. § 56-2-1 (2010); WYO. STAT. § 33-14-101 (2010).
162 See generally statutes cited supra note 161.
163

NATIONAL

CONFERENCE

OF

COMMISSIONERS

ON

UNIFORM

STATE

LAWS

DRAFTING

COMMITTEES (Dec. 6, 2002), http://www.nccusl.org/update/scope&program/RptConsDebt
.1202.pdf.
164
OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE UNIFORM DEBT MANAGEMENT SERVICES ACT,
http://www.udmsa.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) [herinafater UDMSA WEBSITE]. According to
Michael Kerr, Legislative Director for the NCCUSL, some other states (Pennsylvania and Texas,
for example) have enacted Debt Management Services Acts that may be patterned after, or draw
heavily from, the UDMSA, but which are not sufficiently similar to be considered actual enactments of the Uniform Act. Telephone Interview with Michael Kerr, Legislative Dir., Nat'1 Conference of Commn'rs on Unif. State Laws (July 7, 2010).
165 Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, and Washington.
UDMSA WEBSITE, supra note 164.
166
West Virginia Commission on Uniform State Laws Report to the West Virginia Legislature,
W. VA. LEG. S. J. (Mar. 11, 2006), http://www.legis.state.wv.us/BulletinBoard/
2006/rs/senate/s daily-journal/sdj-60th%20day.htm.
167
Interview with Professor Vincent Cardi, ULC Comm'r for the State of W. Va. (Apr. 2010).
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Legislature has not yet passed the Act into law, the NCCUSL continues to actively campaign for the promulgation of the UDMSA in West Virginia. 68
To date, the UDMSA has not been amended to reflect the latest FTC
debt settlement rules, and no efforts to do so have been planned. 16 9 Accordingly,
some parts of the Uniform Act covered by the FTC rules may be preempted;
however, provisions of the UDMSA governing areas not within the scope of the
new regulations, such as transactions occurring online or face-to-face, will remain in place for now both in the states that have already passed the Uniform
Act and in those that would adopt it.
Extensive and detailed summaries of the many provisions of the Uniform Act have been published in various legal and trade journals. 170 The
NCCUSL has also published an annotated version of the UDMSA, with detailed
comments and suggestions about how sections of the Uniform Act might be
adapted to fit the needs of particular states.17 1 For the purposes of this Note, the
following sections outline the major provisions of the proposed law as they apply to the debt settlement industry, with some brief commentary about the purpose of each provision and the way in which the UDMSA is intended to function as a whole.
1.

Scope and Applicability

The debt relief industry, as it is commonly recognized, includes service
providers who define themselves as credit counseling, debt management, debt
settlement, or debt negotiation providers. In the absence of uniform legislation,
state consumer laws that address such services have often struggled to define the
industries they seek to regulate in a way that is not overbroad, yet does not
create loopholes that would exclude key segments of the industry.
The UDMSA addresses this problem by limiting its scope to those companies that act as an "intermediary" between debtors and creditors.172 As a result, the UDMSA brings together debt management and debt settlement companies, treating them, with only slight exceptions, as essentially the same.'7 3 This
Letter from Michael Kerr, Legis. Dir., Nat'l Conf. of Commn'rs on Unif. State Laws, to the
Fed. Trade Comm'n, Office of the Sec'y, 2 (Oct. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/543670-00155.pdf [hereinafter Kerr Letter].
169
Email from Michael Kerr, Legislative Director for the NCCUSL (Aug. 30, 2010) (on file
with author).
170
See, e.g., Linfield, supra note 44; Fred H. Miller, Update on Uniform Laws Affecting Consumer Credit, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 238 (2006); Jeffrey S. Tenenbaum & Jonathon L.
Pompan, Proposed Uniform Debt Management Services Act to Effect Major Changes in the Law,
123 BANKING L. J. 502 (2006); Witzel, supra note 40.
171
See Uniform Debt Management Services Act (2008).
172
Id. at § 2(9).
17
As the definition suggests, the Uniform Act generally does not explicitly distinguish between debt management and debt settlement providers. Certain sections of the Act, however,
168
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definition does not, however, include credit counseling services that offer solely
educational programs. 174 The Act also creates a broad "good faith" exception
for scenarios in which a debt settlement company (1) enters into an agreement
with an individual which it has no reason to know resides in the state at the time
of the agreement, (2) provides or offers to provide services to an individual it
has no reason to know resides in the state, or (3) receives no compensation for
providing debt settlement services.s75
2.

Registration

The first critical reform brought by the Uniform Act is the registration
requirement. Under the proposed regulations, no provider of debt settlement
services may enter into any agreement with a debtor without first registering as
a consumer debt management service in the state in which the consumer resides.176 Registration under the UDMSA requires a company wishing to provide
debt settlement services to submit detailed information about the company, including audited financial statements;' 77 names and addresses of all officers, directors, and owners holding more than a 10% interest;178 locations at which services will be offered;179 business history in other jurisdictions;'8 o and its forms
for agreements with consumers.' 8 '
As part of its registration, a company must provide proof of an effective
insurance policy against fraud, dishonesty, theft, and similar acts in the amount
of $250,000 or more.182 It must also post a surety bond of at least $50,000 or, at
the discretion of the administrator, a smaller amount, and it must maintain a
trust account accessible by the state.
The state may deny registration of a debt settlement company if the application is incomplete; an officer, director, or owner of the company has been
convicted of a crime or has been on the losing end of a civil judgment for dishonesty or the violation of securities laws; an officer, director or owner has defaulted on a debt; or the state finds that the character, financial responsibility,
experience, or general fitness of a company does not indicate that it will be oplogically apply to only one model or the other, and in the official comments, legislators are sometimes advised as to how some options may be manipulated with respect to the different models.
174
Tenenbaum & Pompan, supra note 170, at 504.
1
176
177
178
179

Uniform Debt Management Services Act § 3.
Id. at § 4(a).
Id. at § 6(7).
Id. at § 6(4).
Id. at § 6(3).

1so

Id. at § 6(6).

181

Uniform Debt Management Services Act § 6(12).

182

Id. at § 5(b)(4).
Id. at § 13(b)(1).

183
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erated in compliance with the UDMSA.1 84 Denial is mandatory if the fee is not
provided or the company's board of directors is not disinterested and independent of the company's employees and agents.' 85
If the application is accepted and registration is valid, the state shall issue a certificate to do business.186 Yearly renewal is required.'
3.

Prerequisites and Disclosures

In order to enter into a valid agreement for the provision of debt settlement services, the UDMSA imposes a number of prerequisite and disclosure
requirements. Even before an agreement is reached, debt settlement companies
are required to provide potential clients with an itemized list of the goods and
services to be rendered and the charges for each, including up-front fees,
monthly service fees, settlement fees, or any other charges.
The company
must prepare an individualized financial analysis that includes information
about the number and schedule of payments to be made under the plan and a
determination of whether the company expects the consumer to be able to meet
the payment obligations.' 89 Within these initial disclosures, the company must
alert the consumer to the possibility that debt settlement may have an adverse
effect on the consumer's credit ratingl 90 and of the potential tax implications of
settling a debt for less than its full value.19' Though the provider is not required
to give information about bankruptcy alternatives, it must make the consumer
aware that he may ask the provider about "other ways, including bankruptcy, to
deal with indebtedness."' 92 In addition to debt negotiation and management
services, the Uniform Act requires companies to provide "reasonable education"
about the management of personal finances through certified counselors.' 93

184

Id. at § 9.

18

Id. at § 9(d).

186

Id. at § 9.
Id. at § 11(a).
Uniform Debt Management Services Act § 17; Tenenbaum & Pompan, supra note 170, at

187
188

511.
Uniform Debt Management Services Act § 17(b)(3).
Id. at § 17(d)(3).
191
Id. at § 17(d)(6).
192
Id. at § 17(d)(2).
193
Id. at § 17(b)(1). The comments accompanying this section of the Uniform Act suggest that
"reasonable education" may take the form of an individual session with a certified counselor, a
group class, or an "electronic educational program." Regardless of the setting, the comments
advise that such education should consist of "substantially more than an explanation of the benefits of the program." These comments of course are mere suggestions and not part of the Act
itself; in the absence of more specific legislative guidance, it is unlikely that "reasonable education" under the UDMSA will be substantially different from that which is currently offered.
189
190
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The form and content of the agreement itself are also determined by statute.19 4 In order to comply with the terms of the UDMSA, an agreement must be
memorialized in a signed document that includes contact information for all
parties and makes most of the same basic disclosures that are required in the
pre-agreement communications. 195 In the agreement, the company must make
the consumer aware of the existence of the company's surety bond and insurance policy.' 96 If the provider intends to hold consumers' funds for eventual
disbursement to creditors, the provider must also make available all account
information and information about the financial institution in which the funds
will be kept.197
The statute also regulates the cancellation of an agreement between a
provider and a consumer. Consumers must be afforded a penalty-free three-day
right of rescission.' 98 If the agreement violates certain sections of the
UDMSA,' 99 the penalty-free right to cancel is extended for thirty days.2 00 The
statute provides rigid guidelines for the form and substance of the notice of this
right to cancel.20 ' If the consumer fails to make required payments for a period
202
of at least sixty days, the provider may, at its option, terminate the agreement.
If the provider does choose to terminate a delinquent agreement, it must return
to the consumer all money held in trust for the benefit of the individual and 65%
of any portion of the up-front fee that has not been credited to the account settlement.2 03
Certain provisions of the UDMSA pertaining to the agreement between
providers and consumers apply specifically to debt settlement providers.204 Under the Uniform Act, a consumer can pre-authorize a provider to settle any or all
of the accounts covered by the agreement for up to 50% of the total amount of
the debt.205 If the provider feels that it is unable to settle a debt for less than
50% of its total value, but nonetheless seeks to settle the account, the provider

194
195
196
197

Uniform Debt Management Services Act § 19.
Id. at § 19.
Tenenbaum & Pompan, supra note 170, at 512.

Id.

Uniform Debt Management Services Act § 20(a).
199
The thirty day extension is triggered by violation of § 20(b) (disclosure of three-day right to
cancel), § 19 (form and contents of agreement), or § 28 (prohibited acts or practices).
200
Id. at § 20(a).
201
Id. at § 20(b).
202
Id. at § 26(a).
203
Id. at § 26(b). Because, in the debt settlement model, no money is actually credited against
the consumer's debts until a final settlement is reached, no such deduction should be made.
204
See Tenenbaum & Pompan, supra note 170, at 512.
198

205

Id.
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must obtain the permission of the consumer after the creditor has agreed to the
settlement.206
4.

Fee Structure

The UDMSA also imposes limits on the type and size of fees that may
be charged for the provision of debt settlement services. In return for the provision of debt settlement services, a company may charge an individual a "setup fee" in an amount not exceeding the lesser of $400 or 4% of the amount of
20
debt in the plan at its inception.207 The provider may also collect a "monthly
service fee," not to exceed $10 per creditor left in the plan at the time the fee is
assessed, and in no case more than $50 per month. 2 08 Even if the consumer does
not enter into an agreement for the provision of debt settlement services, a provider may collect a fee of $100 (or more upon the approval of the state administrator) in return for educational and counseling services rendered. 20 9 Finally, in
the event that a settlement is reached, the Uniform Act authorizes debt settlement companies to collect a settlement fee of 30% of the excess of the principle
amount of the debt over the amount paid to the creditor, offset by certain fees
already charged to the individual.2 10
The UMDSA also allows providers to assess flat-rate penalties to clients
who fail to make required payments. In such cases, providers are authorized to
charge consumers a "reasonable charge," not to exceed the lesser of $25 and the
amount permitted by any other state law.211
The Uniform Act specifically provides that the dollar amounts stated
throughout the regulation are to be adjusted to reflect inflation as measured by
the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers or by another index available to the administrator.212
5.

Enforcement and Remedies

Enforcement of the UDMSA occurs at two levels: administrative and
individual.2 13

206

Id.

Uniform Debt Management Services Act § 23(d)(2)(A). Under the new FTC rules, "set-up"
and other advance fees would be prohibited even in a UDMSA state. However, the fee structure
created by the Uniform Act would likely apply to Internet transactions, face-to-face transactions,
and other means not covered by the TSR. See supra Part II.F.
208
Uniform Debt Management Services Act § 23(d)(1)(B).
209
Id. at § 23(d)(4).
210
Id. at § 23(f)(1).
207

211

d
Id. at § 32(f).
213 Tenenbaum & Pompan, supra note 170, at 516-17.
212
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Under the Uniform Act, the administrator (Attorney General, Secretary
of State, or other agency) may act on its own initiative or in response to complaints to enforce the UDMSA and seek the remedies it provides.2 14 The administrator is granted authority to investigate the activities, books, accounts, and
records of any person or company that provides or offers to provide debt management services in order to ensure compliance. 21 5 The administrator may also
issue cease and desist orders,216 orders to grant restitution, and civil penalties of
up to $10,000 ($20,000 for knowingly violating an administrator-issued cease
and desist order or order to grant restitution).217 It is also authorized to bring
civil actions in state court.2 18
An individual may bring a civil action for compensatory damages, including treble damages if a provider obtains fees or payments not authorized by
the UDMSA, and may also seek punitive damages and attorneys' fees. 2 19
B.

220

The West Virginia Attorney General'sStrategy

In West Virginia, the Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division
is tasked with the responsibility of mediating consumer claims and enforcing the
state's generally strong consumer protection statutes. 22 1 Though the division has
handled complaints related to consumer credit counseling for many years, only
recently has it begun to deal directly with the debt settlement industry.2 22 In
214
215
216
217
218
219

Uniform Debt Management Services Act § 32(a).
Id. at § 32(b).
Id. at § 33(a)(1).

Id. at § 33(a)(3), (b).
Id. at § 33(a)(4).
Id. at § 35(c).

"The West Virginia Attorney General's Strategy" has never been a formal designation used
by the Office of the Attorney General. Rather, I use this phrase to reflect the overall approach
taken by the Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division in combating unscrupulous debt
settlement companies. Though each case is unique, I have, through interviews with attorneys and
review of numerous briefs, filings, and other documents in debt settlement litigation, attempted to
illuminate and refine the common elements of the Attorney General's legal strategies.
221
Most frequently, the Attorney General enforces the West Virginia Consumer Credit and
Protection Act, found at W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-101 to -8-102 (2010).
222
The West Virginia Attorney General defines "debt settlement" as:
220

[A] plan or strategy offered for a fee to provide debt relief for consumers in
which consumers are advised or expected to stop making payments to their
unsecured creditors. The consumers are directed to make periodic payments
to the debt settlement company or into a separate fund for an unspecified time
until the debt settlement company determines that sufficient funds have been
accumulated to attempt to negotiate a lumpsum settlement of one or more of
the consumers accounts for less than the actual balance owed.
Assurance of Discontinuance, In the Matter of the Investigation of Consumer Credit Counseling
of America, Inc., Before the Attorney Gen. of W. Va. 2 (2007) [hereinafter CCCA Assurance] (on
file with author).
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2006, the Attorney General reached settlement agreements in three such cases, 22 3 and since that time has executed "Assurances of Discontinuance" 224 with
ten more debt settlement companies. 225
Over time, the Consumer Protection Division has developed an informal
but comprehensive strategy for protecting West Virginians from debt settlement
abuses. While keeping alive the possibility that debt settlement may be lawfully
practiced by duly licensed and qualified attorneys, the Attorney General maintains that the non-attorney, for-profit debt settlement industry, as it is currently
practiced, is inherently unlawful in West Virginia.2 26 This position is based on
several existing statutory protections-the West Virginia Debt Pooling statute,
the West Virginia Credit Services Organization Act (CSO Act), and the various
rules and regulations governing the unauthorized practice of law-that, while
not directly confronting the debt settlement industry, have been held to apply to
the most common and harmful deceptive practices of debt settlement companies. 2 27 Taken together, the Attorney General asserts that the violation of these
laws, or any other law created to protect the public or foster fair and honest
competition, are deemed to be unfair or deceptive acts or practices as defined by

Press Release, W. Va. Attorney Gen., State ex. rel. McGraw v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp. (May 25, 2006), available at http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfin; Press Release, W. Va
Attorney Gen., State ex. rel. McGraw v. Debt Mgmt. Credit Counseling Corp. (Jan. 1, 2006)
available at http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfrn; Press Release, W. Va. Attorney Gen., State ex. rel.
McGraw v. Help Ministries d/b/a Debt Free (Sept. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfmn.
224
Assurances of Discontinuance are binding agreements entered into by the Attorney General
and a party under investigation, authorized by W. VA CODE § 46A-7-107 (2010). For a more
detailed explanation, see infra Part II.B. 1.
225
Press Release, W. Va. Attorney Gen., State ex. rel. McGraw v. Debt Relief
L.P. (May 16,
2007), availableat http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfm; Press Release, W. Va. Attorney Gen., State
ex. rel. McGraw v. Fidelity Debt Consultants, Inc. (May 16, 2007), available at
http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfrn; Press Release, W. Va. Attorney Gen., State ex. rel. McGraw v.
David
Huffman
d/b/a
Freedom
Group
(May
16,
2007),
available at
http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfi; Press Release, W. Va. Attorney Gen., State ex. rel. McGraw v.
New Horizons Debt Relief (May 16, 2007), availableat http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfm; Press
Release, W. Va. Attorney Gen., State ex. rel. McGraw v. PDM Int'l, Inc. (2009), available at
http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfin; Press Release, W. Va. Attorney Gen., State ex. rel. McGraw v.
Consumer Credit Counseling of Am.,
Inc. (Sept.
3, 2008),
available at
http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfin; Press Release, W. Va. Attorney Gen., State ex. rel. McGraw v.
Debt Relief USA, Inc. (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfm; Press Release, W. Va. Attorney Gen., State ex. rel. McGraw v. Acushield Fin. Serv.'s (Sept. 3, 2008),
available at http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfm; Press Release, W. Va. Attorney Gen., State ex. rel.
McGraw
v.
Am.
Debt
Solutions,
Inc.
(May
8,
2009),
available at
http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfm.
226 Telephone Interview with Norman Googel, Deputy Attorney Gen., West Virginia Attorney
Gen. Consumer Prot. Div. (Jan. 4, 2010). See also Goodman, supra note 54 (quoting Mr. Googel:
"The industry's not legitimate").
223

227

See infra Part II.B.2.
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the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA). 2 28 Any
individual or company that engages in willful and repeated violations of the
WVCCPA may be subject to civil penalties for each violation, in addition to
compensatory damages.229
1.

Procedural Overview of the Attorney General's Strategy

When a claim is filed with the Attorney General's office, trained mediators interview consumers, contact the companies in question, and verify, to the
best of their ability, the facts in question. The mediators also serve a screening
function, making sure that legitimate businesses are not unduly harmed by frivolous claims.
When the mediators determine that a claim has potential merit, it is assigned to an Assistant Attorney General for further investigation. The attorney
conducts further interviews with the consumer, contacts the company if appropriate, and attempts to collect any signed agreements, bank or credit card statements, authorizations, or other paperwork that might be relevant to the investigation. If a company is not forthcoming, the Attorney General has the power to
subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, adduce evidence, and/or require
the production of any documents relevant to the investigation.230
If a debt settlement company is found to have violated the law, the Attorney General may initiate a suit in state court.2 3 ' Though the Consumer Protection Division has won a number of favorable rulings in preliminary hearings,
to date, no case involving debt settlement has advanced to the trial stage. Instead, the Attorney General has generally exercised its statutory power to settle
complaints through the execution of an "Assurance of Discontinuance." 2 3 2
When it is claimed that a company or individual has engaged in conduct that
violates the law and may be subject to an order by the Attorney General or by a
court, the Attorney General may accept an assurance in writing that the company or individual will not engage in the same conduct in the future.233 Though
such an assurance is not an admission of guilt, should the party making the assurance fail to abide by its terms, it becomes prima facie evidence that prior to
the execution of the agreement, the company or individual did in fact engage in

228

See CCCA Assurance, supra note 222; Assurance of Discontinuance, In the Matter of the
Investigation of Debt Relief USA, Inc., Before the Attorney Gen. of W. Va. (Apr. 2, 2008) [hereinafter Debt Relief Assurance]; Assurance of Discontinuance, In the Matter of the Investigation of
PDM International, Inc., Before the Attorney Gen. of W. Va. (Jun. 5, 2008) [hereinafter PDM
Assurance].
229
W. VA. CODE § 46A-7-111 (2010).
230
§ 46A-7-104(1) (2010).
231
§ 46A-7-102(l)(a).
232

§ 46A-7-107.

233

id
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the conduct described therein.23 4 Usually, such assurances include not only the
promise to cease the prohibited conduct, but also the terms under which the
company or individual will redress the grievances of the consumers (present and
future) who have been harmed.235 In the debt settlement context, a typical Assurance of Discontinuance may require the company (and any and all subsidiaries, agents, and affiliates) to do the following, among other, conditions: 2 36
1. Comply with all terms of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, Debt Pooling Act, Credit Services Organization Act, West Virginia regulations governing the practice of law, and any other relevant federal or state laws.237
2. Permanently refrain from offering any debt settlement or related services to West Virginia consumers.
3. Provide the Attorney General with a report containing the
names, contact information, and amount charged to any West
Virginia consumer.
4. Refund all fees and charges made to West Virginia consumers in connection with debt settlement activity, less any
amount actually paid to creditors.
5. Facilitate the process of releasing any funds deposited in
savings accounts in banks affiliated with the company.
The use of Assurances of Discontinuance has proved to be an effective
strategy, and will likely continue in its role as the primary enforcement mechanism in future actions against debt settlement providers.
2.

Legal Elements of the Attorney General's Strategy

Of course, in order to convince a debt settlement company to enter into
such an agreement, the Attorney General must present compelling legal argu234

Id.

CCCA Assurance, supra note 222; Debt Relief Assurance, supra note 228; PDM Assurance,
supra note 228.
236
Though the elements of a particular Assurance of Discontinuance may vary and are subject
to negotiation by the parties, the examples listed are drawn from actual Assurances of Discontinuance entered into by the Attorney General and various debt settlement providers. See generally
CCCA Assurance, supra note 222; Debt Relief Assurance, supra note 228; and PDM Assurance,
supra note 228.
237
See infra Part Ill.B.2 for a discussion of the Attorney General's application of these statutes
to the debt settlement industry.
235
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ments that are likely to succeed in front of a West Virginia circuit judge.238
Although each case presents its own unique factual and legal elements, generally speaking, the Attorney General bases his Assurances of Discontinuance on
three main legal arguments: the Debt Pooling Statute, the Credit Services Organizations Act, and the laws governing the unauthorized practice of law.
a.

Debt Pooling Statute

Today's debt settlement companies are heir to the legacy of the "debt
poolers" of the early 20th century. 239 Frequent abuses at the hands of unscrupulous debt poolers and credit counselors led many states, including West Virginia, to enact legislation aimed at protecting consumers from the most common
24 0
and harmful schemes, officially known as "crimes against public policy."
Although the debt settlement model differs in certain aspects from the debt
pooling schemes contemplated when the statute was enacted, the plain language
of the statute clearly covers many of the practices currently employed by debt
settlement companies doing business in the state, and the Attorney General continues to enforce it as it applies.
The "Debt Pooling Statute" limits the fees that may be charged by a
firm offering debt reduction services. Specifically, the statute defines "debt
pooling" as:
[T]he rendering in any manner of advice or services of any and
every kind in the establishment or operation of a plan pursuant
to which a debtor would deposit or does deposit funds for the
purpose of distributing such funds among his creditors.2 41
The statute authorizes a non-profit firm offering such services to charge
a monthly service fee of up to 7% of the total amount of money paid pursuant to
the plan as reimbursement for its costs, including the costs of general counseling
services regarding personal money management.2 42 For-profit firms (such as
most modern debt settlement companies) may charge a monthly service fee of
no more than 2% of the total amount of money deposited pursuant to the plan.24 3
There is virtually no published case law in this area of the law. The Attorney General is
charged by statute with interpreting, applying, and enforcing the various provisions of the West
Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, and so until such time as any circuit courts, or the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals interprets the various statutes applied to the debt settlement industry, the Attorney General's interpretation remains the most persuasive statement of the
law.
239
See supra Part II.C.
240
W. VA. CODE § 61-10-23 (2010).
238

241
242
243

Id
Id.
Id.
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In no event (for-profit or non-profit) does the statute authorize a company offer244
ing such services to collect an "up-front fee" or any other fees or charges.
Since it first began handling debt settlement complaints in the early
2000s, the Attorney General has maintained that the practice of offering debt
settlement services as a means of helping consumers obtain debt relief constitutes debt pooling as defined by the Debt Pooling Statute, and is subject to the
terms and restrictions set forth therein. 24 5 And in the course of its investigations,
the Attorney General has frequently concluded that the various fees and charges
assessed by debt settlement providers doing business in West Virginia violate
the Debt Pooling Statute. In one typical case, a debt settlement company
charged consumers a "monthly maintenance fee" ranging from $29.95 per
month to $39.95 per month, depending on the total amount of debt the consumer
sought to eliminate (rather than the statutorily imposed percentage of the
amount deposited); an up-front fee, characterized as an "administrative fee," of
10% of the total amount of debt that the consumer sought to eliminate; and a
"negotiation fee" of 13% of the total amount of debt allegedly saved for the
consumer in each account settlement. 246 Such fees clearly exceeded the
amounts allowed by law, and the Attorney General was able to force the offending company to enter into an Assurance of Discontinuance.247
Enforcement of the Debt Pooling Statute protects West Virginian consumers by limiting the ability of debt settlement companies to charge exorbitant
fees that reduce the amount of money used to pay down debt and cause many
consumers to be unable to complete a debt settlement program.
b.

Credit Services Organization Act

The Attorney General also seeks to protect consumers against unscrupulous debt settlement providers through enforcement of the Credit Services
Organization Act (CSO Act), which imposes a wide range of obligations on any
company that purports to provide "credit services."248 Under the CSO Act, a
company offers "credit services" when it claims that it will:
(1) improve the consumer's credit record, history, or rating;
(2) obtain an extension of credit for a consumer; or

244

Id,

245

Debt Relief Assurance, supra note 228, at 3.
Id. at 4-5.

246
247

Id at 1.

248

W. VA. CODE

§ 46A-6C-1 to -12 (2008).
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(3) provide advice or assistance to a consumer with regard to
subsections (1) or (2).249
Companies falling under the scope of the CSO Act cannot do business
in West Virginia without first filing a registration statement with the Secretary
of State.250 If such a company wishes to charge consumers fees before completing performance of the credit services (i.e., monthly service charges), it must
also obtain a surety bond or establish a surety account with the Secretary of
State.2525 Prior to rendering any credit services, a company must provide consumers with an extensive disclosure statement, as outlined in the CSO Act.252
249
250

251
252

§ 46A-6C-2(a).
§46A-6C-5.
§ 46A-6C-4(a).
The CSO Act requires that
[b]efore executing a contract or agreement with a buyer or receiving money or
other valuable consideration, a credit services organization shall provide the
buyer with a statement in writing, containing:
(1) A complete and detailed description of the services to be performed by the
credit services organization for the buyer and the total cost of the services;
(2) A statement explaining the buyer's right of proceed against the bond or surety account required by section three of this article;
(3) The name and address of the surety company that issued the bond, or the
name and address of the depository and the trustee, and the account number of
the surety account;
(4) A complete and accurate statement of the buyer's right to review any file
on the buyer maintained by a consumer reporting agency, as provided by the
Fair Credit Reporting Act. (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681 et seq.);
(5) A statement that the buyer's file is available for review at no charge on request made to the consumer reporting agency within thirty days after the date
of receipt of notice that credit has been denied, and that the buyer's file is
available for a minimal charge at any other time;
(6) A complete and accurate statement of the buyer's right to dispute directly
with the consumer reporting agency the completeness or accuracy of any item
contained in a file on the buyer maintained by that consumer reporting agency;
(7) A statement that accurate information cannot be permanently removed
from the files of a consumer reporting agency;
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Any agreement between a credit services provider and a consumer must be memorialized in a contract containing the specific terms prescribed by the statute,
including an unconditional right to cancel.253
The Attorney General has interpreted the statute to apply to companies
offering debt settlement services as a means of affording debt relief to West
Virginian consumers.254 Promises to assist consumers in reducing credit card
interest, lowering monthly payments, reducing or eliminating debt, and improving credit are ubiquitous in the marketing of debt settlement services. 25 5 Debt
settlement companies doing business in West Virginia have touted their services
as an alternative to bankruptcy, promised consumers a drastic improvement in
debt-to-income ratio, and even pledged to eliminate debt entirely. 256 Taken as a
whole, the Attorney General contends that such promises amount to an offer to
improve a consumer's overall credit worthiness.25 7
In nearly every instance, debt settlement companies with high numbers
of consumer complaints have also failed to meet the requirements of the CSO
Act: they have not registered or posted a bond with the Secretary of State, made
appropriate disclosures, or complied with the CSO Act's contract require258
sc cases, the Attorney General is able to threaten enforcement
In such
ments.
under the CSO Act to force non-compliant debt settlement companies to discontinue their harmful practices.
c.

Unauthorized Practice of Law

Often, debt settlement companies purport to offer services that may be
lawfully provided only by a licensed attorney. Even in cases in which debt settlement providers actually employ one or more licensed attorneys, such associa-

(8) A complete and accurate statement of when consumer information becomes obsolete, and of when consumer reporting agencies are prevented from
issuing reports containing obsolete information; and
(9) A complete and accurate statement of the availability of nonprofit credit
counseling services.

§ 46A-6C-6.
W. VA. CODE § 46A-6C-7 (2010).
Debt Relief Assurance, supra, note 228, at 3.
255
CCCA Assurance, supra note 222, at 8.
256
Debt Relief Assurance, supra note 228, at 5; CCCA Assurance, supra note 222, at 8.
257
Debt Relief Assurance, supra note 228, at 5; CCCA Assurance, supra note 222, at 8.
258
See, e.g., Debt Relief Assurance, supra note 228, at 5-6; CCCA Assurance, supra note 222,
at 8; PDM Assurance, supra note 228, at 5.
253

254
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tions typically amount to little more than the limited rental of a law license in a
superficial attempt to show legitimacy and compliance.259
In West Virginia, the Supreme Court of Appeals is vested with the constitutional authority to define, regulate, and control the practice of law.260 In
accordance with such authority, and to "protect the public from being advised
and represented in legal matters by unqualified and undisciplined persons over
whom the courts could exercise little, if any control,"26 1 the Court has defined
the practice of law as follows:
In general, one is deemed to be practicing law whenever he or it
furnishes to another advice or service under circumstances
which imply the possession of [or] use of and use of legal knowledge and skill.
More specifically... one is deemed to be practicing law whenever (1) one undertakes, with or without compensation. . .to advise another in any matter involving the application of legal
principles to facts, purposes or desires; (2) one undertakes, with
or without compensation. . . to preparefor another legal instruments of any character; or (3)

one undertakes. . . to

represent the interests of another before any judicial tribunal or
officer... 262
In order to render such services, an individual must be admitted to the West
Virginia State Bar by the Board of Law Examiners in accordance with the Rules
for Admission to the Practice of Law promulgated by the Court. 2 63
Many of the services typically provided by debt settlement companies
fall under this broad definition of the practice of law. Evaluating a consumer's
financial circumstances to determine whether debt settlement is an advisable
plan, negotiating with creditors on behalf of a consumer to achieve account settlements, and charging a contingency fee based on a percentage of the amount
allegedly saved in settlement are all services that, in West Virginia, must be
performed by a licensed member of the Bar.264 The ability to go after debt settlement providers who recklessly endanger consumers by offering unsound legal
advice is an important tool in the Attorney General's fight to eliminate predatory debt settlement practices.
Testimony before the Texas State Legislature, Michael Kerr, Legislative Director, Nat'l
Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws (June 29, 2010); Telephone Interview with Norman
Googel, Deputy Attorney Gen., W. Va. Attorney Gen. Con. Prot. Div. (Jan., 4 2010).
260
W. VA. CONST. art. 8 §1; W. VA. CODE § 51-1-4(a) (2010).
261
Frieson v. Isner, 168 W. Va. 758, 769 (1981).
262
Brammer v. Taylor, 338 S.E.2d 207, 212 n.7 (W. Va. 1985) (emphasis in original).
263
W. VA. CODE § 5 1-1-4(a) (2010).
264
CCCA Assurance, supra note 222, at 5.
259
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IV. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STRATEGY ISTHE BEST SOLUTION FOR WEST
VIRGINIA
The Attorney General's strategy and the UDMSA, although similar in
many respects, are born of vastly different philosophies about the function and
value of debt settlement providers to consumers.
The UDMSA is as much about facilitating the expansion of the debt settlement industry as it is about helping consumers avoid abuses. The NCCUSL
exists, in large part, to help nationwide commercial enterprises avoid the confu26
sion of multiple jurisdictions and conflicting legal requirements.265
The stated
purpose of its product, the UDMSA, is to "rein in excesses" while permitting
debt settlement companies to continue providing services without drastically
altering their business model.266 Although the Uniform Act aims to, and succeeds in, providing genuine protections against the worst debt settlement practices, it is no secret that numerous industry trade groups took part in the drafting
of the UDMSA and actively campaign for its promulgation in all states.26 7 At
best, it is an effort to balance the competing interests of commerce and consumer protection that takes the commerce side of the equation quite seriously.
The West Virginia Attorney General's strategy weighs those factors differently. The Attorney General's primary duty is to the citizens of West Virginia, and while that duty includes the responsibility not to harm West Virginia's
economy by hampering legitimate business interests, many debt settlement
companies are neither legitimate nor substantial contributors to the local economy. 268 Unlike the UDMSA, the Attorney General sides with consumer advocacy groups, like the National Consumer Law Center, who find the debt settlement model "inherently harmful" to consumers. 269 Although tough financial
times and the revised bankruptcy laws create a demand for debt counseling and
management services, the Attorney General sees no reason to encourage or facilitate the expansion of the debt settlement industry.
Thus, for West Virginia and West Virginians, the Attorney General's
comprehensive strategy for policing the debt settlement industry is the superior
solution. By taking advantage of West Virginia's long tradition of aggressive
265

About the NCCUSL, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,

http://www.nccusl.org, (last visited Sept. 7, 2010).
266

Linfield, supranote 44, at 61; UNIFORM DEBT MANAGEMENT SERVICES ACT, Prefatory Note.

According to the official website of the UDMSA, the International Association of Professional Debt Arbitrators, the United States Organization's for Bankruptcy Alternatives, and the
Association of Settlement Companies each are "participating in the adoption of the [UDMSA] for
all 50 states."Official Website of the Uniform Debt Management Services Act, Links of Interest,
http://www.udmsa.org/links.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2010).
268
As of 2010, no debt settlement companies maintain physical offices in West Virginia, employ any West Virginians, or pay business taxes of any kind in the state.
269
NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 1; Telephone Interview with Norman Googel, Deputy
Attorney Gen., W. Va. Attorney Gen. Consumer Prot. Div. (Jan. 4, 2010).
267
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consumer advocacy and strong consumer protection laws and remedies, it maximizes the natural attributes that make West Virginia an unattractive environment for predatory schemes, while minimizing a company's ability to take advantage of consumers.
The Debt Settlement Industry Cannot be Effectively Regulated by Laws
that Focus Primarilyon Debt Management Services or on the Debt ReliefIndustry as a Whole

A.

Historically, one of the great challenges in regulating the consumer debt
relief industry has been in keeping up with changing business models. 27 0 As the
industry shifts from one paradigm to the next, laws tailored for older business
models may become inapplicable or ineffective. One solution to this problem is
to attempt comprehensive reform of the entire debt relief industry by employing
broad and general protections and regulatory schemes that aim to bring a great
number of existing and potential programs under its scope. Unfortunately, laws
designed primarily to regulate DMPs or credit counseling programs are unlikely
to provide ideal protection against abuses specific to the debt settlement industry.
This difficulty has led many consumer protection experts to the conclusion that the debt settlement industry must be regulated separately from the
debt-relief industry as a whole.271 On this point consumer advocates and at least
one main industry trade group are in concurrence. Analysis of various regulatory models, including the UDMSA, has led the NCLC to unequivocally assert
that "debt settlement practices should be separately regulated from debt management practices." 272 Somewhat more surprisingly, in a report created primarily to refute many of the claims made by the NCLC, the Association of Settlement Companies reached the same conclusion by bluntly acknowledging that
the debt settlement model requires a unique solution.273
The UDMSA represents a prime example of such regulatory overbreadth. While the Uniform Act does, to a limited degree, draw distinctions
between debt settlement and debt management providers, most of its provisions
tend to treat the debt settlement model as something of an afterthought.27 4 In
certain parts, "general" provisions become nonsensical when applied to the debt
settlement context. 27 5 Such internal inconsistency is indicative of the problems
inherent in drafting a single act intended to regulate distinct business models.
270

See supra Part II.C for a discussion of the evolution of debt settlement services.

271

NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 21.

272

Id.

273

TASC STUDY, supra note 30, at 8.

274

NCLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 15.

For example, § 26(b) of the UDMSA requires a provider who elects to terminate an agreement to refund to a consumer any money held in trust for the consumers benefit, less any amount
already credited toward settlement. In the debt settlement context, such a provision is absurd-by
275
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Though the Attorney General's approach relies on laws not originally
created for regulation of the modem debt settlement industry, its application, as
evidenced in the various Assurances of Discontinuance, has been specifically
tailored to deal with common abuses in the debt settlement industry, such as
excessive fees, failure to provide refunds, and the unauthorized practice of law.
It satisfies the need to anticipate future changes in the debt relief industry
through flexibility and adaptability. Such strengths are a boon for consumers
and legitimate industry alike-because the Attorney General's strategy is aimed
uniquely at debt settlement, it places no additional cost or undue burden on responsible debt management or credit counseling agencies that do business in
accordance with state and federal law.
B.

The UDMSA Legitimizes the Debt Settlement Industry and Undermines
the Attorney General'sCurrent, Successful Approach

Passage of the UDMSA in West Virginia would force the State to officially acknowledge the legitimacy of any debt settlement company that facially
complies with the terms of the Uniform Act, and would likely result in an increase in the number of debt settlement companies operating within its borders.
Although industry representatives are quick to blame rogue companies
for debt settlement's bad reputation, 276 many consumer advocates believe that
even those providers that operate without deception are a bad deal-in financial
terms-for most consumers. 2 77 Though it has stopped short of declaring the
debt settlement model unlawful, per se, the Attorney General's enforcement
actions against companies providing debt settlement services in West Virginia
are a powerful indictment of the legitimacy of the debt settlement industry as a
whole. This position has been the Attorney General's trump card-fearful that
the State might push even further, most debt settlement companies are willing to
make aggrieved consumers whole.
Under the UDMSA, the Attorney General would no longer be able to
leverage this position. Although the protections afforded by the UDMSA might
be preferable to the status quo in some states, in West Virginia, it would completely undermine the successful approach currently in place. The Debt Pooling
Statute, CSO Act, and unauthorized practice of law regulations would be
preempted or rendered toothless by the UDMSA.
Further, the UDMSA would strip the Attorney General's strategy of its
adaptability. Currently, when consumers report new types of abuses, the
WVCCPA provides sufficient leverage to force debt settlement providers to
voluntarily cease such activities. Under the UDMSA, instead of using the
its nature, no money can be so applied until settlement of an account is final. For a more detailed
description of section 26(b), see supra Part III.A.3.
276
See TASC STUDY, supra note 30, at 2.
277
See supra Part II.D.3 for a discussion of the questionable value of the services provided by
many debt settlement companies.
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WVCCPA to force debt settlement companies to the bargaining table, the Attorney General would be limited to enforcing only those actions made explicitly
unlawful by the UDMSA. This leaves consumers vulnerable because, as illustrated below, a UDMSA compliant debt settlement provider is not, in all circumstances, a harmless one.
C.

The Terms of the UDMSA do not Provide Sufficient Protectionfor Consumers

There is reason to be concerned that the specific protections embodied
in the UDMSA do not go far enough to protect consumers from abuses and illinformed decisions to enter into debt settlement programs. Alternatively, the
Attorney General's strategy offers many of the same protections as the
UDMSA, while absolutely prohibiting certain harmful practices that the Uniform Act allows.
While the UDMSA makes an admirable attempt to limit the fees that
debt settlement providers can extract from consumers, a company may be in
total compliance with the Uniform Act while charging its customers excessive
fees in return for relatively few services rendered. The UDMSA authorizes virtually every fee that unregulated debt settlement companies rely on, including
simultaneous assessment of set-up, monthly maintenance, and settlement fees.
Although the Act places caps on such fees, they are hardly insubstantial; they
place a potentially unreasonable strain on a consumer's finances and increase
the likelihood that the consumer will be unable to complete the program. And
while the Act provides for an unconditional three-day right to cancel an agreement, it does not require a debt settlement company to provide refunds to consumers whose accounts are never settled.
Consider a hypothetical consumer who enrolls online in a debt settlement plan with $20,000 worth of unsecured debt from five different creditors.
The fees charged by his debt settlement provider are in total compliance with
the UDMSA. Before any services whatsoever are rendered, he is assessed a
$400 set-up charge and a $50 monthly fee.278 Over the next 18 months, while
the debt settlement company simply "waits out" his creditors, he will owe upwards of $900 in monthly maintenance fees while being expected to make regular contributions to the "reserve" account intended for settlement. When a
monthly payment is late, he is assessed what amounts to a 50% penalty. If the
consumer can fend off collection efforts and avoid lawsuits, and the accounts
are finally settled for 50% of the principle balance, the company will collect an
additional $1600 settlement fee. If not, the debt settlement company is entitled
to keep the fees for "services rendered." Even under the limits set by the
UDMSA, it is unreasonable to believe that the sort of financially at-risk conAlthough the new FTC rules prohibit companies enrolling consumers over the telephone
from charging advance fees, an Internet-based or face-to-face debt settlement provider is not subject to the ban. See supra Part II.F.
278
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sumers targeted by the debt settlement industry will be able to complete a debt
settlement program that imposes such fees.
On the other hand, through enforcement of the Debt Pooling Statute, the
Attorney General's strategy bans up-front fees in all debt settlement agreements,
which are most harmful because they limit the ability of consumers to save
money towards paying their creditors before any actual savings have been realized. Unlike the fees allowed by the UDMSA, the monthly charges authorized
under the Debt Pooling Statute are directly tied to the amount of money deposited by the consumer into the reserve fund. This insures that the consumer is
actually building toward a realistic settlement, rather than squandering his limited resources on excessive fees. The company is not authorized to assess a
settlement fee, a fraction of a sum that the client never possesses in the first
place. Under this scheme, consumers are much more likely to complete a debt
settlement program-a win-win scenario for debtors and creditors alike.
Aside from limiting fees, the main mechanism by which the UDMSA
purports to protect consumers is through the imposition of an extensive disclosure regime. Under the Uniform Act, a debt settlement provider must make
certain disclosures to the state through the registration process-financial statements, corporate officers, proof of accreditation and insurance, etc.279-and certain disclosures to consumers-termination rights, fee schedules, trust account
information, and other relevant rights-before entering into an agreement.280
This seems to reflect the philosophy that an open deal is a fair deal.
The Attorney General's strategy rejects this notion and adheres to the
philosophy that a raw deal, disclosed, is a raw deal. Consumer advocates have
long suspected that mere disclosures provide inadequate protection for consumers, and recent empirical studies support their suspicion.2 8 1 It is unrealistic to
expect that consumers, particularly the cohort of consumers that tend to find
themselves in debt crises in the first place, are able to fully comprehend the impact that a debt settlement plan will have on their personal financial fortunes,
regardless of how clearly that plan is set forth.

See supra Part III.A.2 for a description of the UDMSA's registration requirements.
See supra Part III.A.3 for a description of the UDMSA's required disclosures.
281
Paul O'Shea, Consumer Credit Code Disclosure: Does it Work?, 16 U. OF QUEENSLAND J.
OF BANKING AND FIN. L. AND PRACTICE 5, availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-1312963. ("Since
1996 all consumer credit transactions in Australia have been regulated by the Consumer Credit
Code. The principal means by which the Code purports to protect consumers and prevent market
failure is a detailed and prescriptive disclosure regime. [Prior to this study] [t]here has been little
empirical work done on whether or not such disclosure actually improves consumers' understanding of their credit contracts. By exposing participants to typical consumer credit documents, this
research discovered quite poor comprehension of important features of the relevant transactions.
Most significantly, there appeared to be little difference in comprehension when the consumers
read contracts which complied with the disclosure requirements of the Code, and when they read
contracts which did not. These results cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Code disclosure regime.").
279
280
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Disclosure that "debt management plans are not right for all individuals" 282 means little to a debt-burdened consumer who has been bombarded by
targeted advertisements, or spoken with a customer service representative who
asserted otherwise. Disclosure that a debt settlement program may result in
damage to a consumer's credit rating is of little benefit when consumers have
been promised that debt settlement will stop harassing collection calls. And
what consumer, capable of fully comprehending such a disclosure, would agree
to a provision that allows a debt settlement company to keep 100% of all set-up
and monthly maintenance fees, regardless of whether a settlement is ever
reached? The disclosure of a term that is harmful to consumers does not alter
the fundamental wrongness of the practice, and to that extent, reliance on disclosure as a primary mechanism of consumer protection is a critical weakness of
the UDMSA.
Other issues, either overlooked or unanticipated in the drafting of the
Uniform Act, are also cause for concern. Although the UDMSA does cover
"agents" and "affiliates" of debt settlement providers 283 the failure to explicitly
include "leads generators" opens the door to abuses from companies who are
not themselves debt settlement companies, but merely advertise, perform intake
functions, and pass on consumers to a third-party debt settlement provider. The
same is true for so-called "escrow" companies, who provide substantially the
same services as debt settlement providers but may be able to escape regulation
under the UDMSA definitions. The UDMSA also fails to adequately address
the problems caused by the use of licensed attorneys to avoid state regulation or
to lead consumers to believe that threatened litigation, garnishments, or other
issues are being handled by an attorney, when no such services are in fact provided. Finally, the UDMSA does little to curb the use of deceptive advertising,
particularly claims about success rates and misleading allusions to fictitious
government programs.
In general, to the extent that the UDMSA does offer valuable consumer
protections, any such protection is substantially replicated, or strengthened, by
the Attorney General's strategy.
D.

Enforcement of the UDMSA is Inferior to Enforcement Under the West
Virginia Strategy

It is not yet clear how enforcement of the UDMSA will fare in practice,
as it has only recently gone into effect in the states that have already adopted
it.2 84 On paper, however, enforcement under the Uniform Act appears to be a
rather cumbersome and potentially ineffective process.
Uniform Debt Management Services Act §17(e)(1).
Id. at § 2(2).
284
As of October 2010, no opinions directly involving the UDMSA (as implemented by any
state) have been published.
282
283

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010

45

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 12
WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW

254

[Vol. 113

In most states, implementation of the UDMSA will require the creation
of a new agency tasked with registering providers, investigating claims, and
enforcing remedies. In a "legislative note" to Section 1 of the Act, the drafters
suggest that choices for the "administrator" of the Act might logically include
the Attorney General or other agency tasked with consumer protection responsibilities. 285 In West Virginia, finding a staff capable of taking on the bureaucratic
responsibilities of the Act would likely require the creation of an entirely new
branch of the Consumer Protection Division. Creation of such a department
would come at no small expense.
On its surface, the UDMSA seems to grant the administrator (in whatever form it may take) fairly broad enforcement powers.286 The administrator is
responsible for investigating claims of non-compliance "by subpoena or otherwise."287 If the investigation supports such action, the administrator may issue
cease-and-desist orders, order restitution to an aggrieved party, or impose a civil
penalty of up to $10,000 per violation.288 The administrator may also initiate a
lawsuit in state court. 289
Upon closer examination, however, these powers appear relatively
weak. The subpoena power mentioned under the Act is vague, and might be
rendered ineffectual by state court rulings generally limiting the scope of investigative subpoenas by state agencies. 2 90 And like any administrative agency, the
administrator of the UDMSA would be powerless to enforce its own decrees.29 1
Undoubtedly, some debt settlement companies, right or wrong, will refuse to
voluntarily comply with an order, and the administrator will be forced to find a
judge willing to enforce it. The Act specifically provides for affirmative "good
faith" defenses to alleged violations, an exception that cries out for judicial interpretation. 2 92 Debt settlement companies, well-versed in litigation, will challenge these weaknesses, which will increase the costs to the state and delay justice for consumers.
In sharp contrast, the West Virginia Attorney General has developed a
relatively quick, low-cost, litigation-free method for enforcing its legal positions. As described above, investigations of debt settlement claims are handled
as part of the same basic mechanism by which any claim of consumer fraud is
initiated.2 9 3 Under West Virginia law, the Attorney General's subpoena power
285

Uniform Debt Management Services Act §2 (legislative note accompanying draft).

286

See supra Part III.A.5 for a summary of the UDMSA's enforcement mechanisms.
Uniform Debt Management Services Act § 32(b).

287
288

Id at § 33(a)(l)-(3).

Id. at §33(a)(4).
290
See Hoover v. Berger, 483 S.E.2d 12 (W. Va. 1996).
291
See id.
292
Uniform Debt Management Services Act §§ 33(e), 35(f) (2008).
293
See supra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of the procedure by which the Attorney General
investigates consumer claims.
289
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is broad, and courts have generally been willing to enforce it. 2 94 In addition,
when enforcing the WVCCPA, the Attorney General enjoys a special standard
of review for procuring temporary injunctions.2 95 When an investigation unearths credible evidence of crimes against West Virginia consumers, the Attorney General uses these powers to bind the offending company to a favorable
Assurance of Discontinuance.
The Attorney General prefers the use of Assurances of Discontinuance
because they provide great leverage in setting the terms of the settlement, and
lay the groundwork for future legal action should the agreement be violated.2 9 6
Companies prefer Assurances of Discontinuance because they typically do not
include punitive damages and generate less publicity than extended court battles. Both sides are happy to avoid costly litigation, and because the assurances
are mutually agreed upon, they typically do not require court enforcement. The
civil penalties available under West Virginia law, particularly the WVCCPA,
provide ample leverage with which to convince debt settlement companies to
meet the Attorney General's demands.
Assurances of Discontinuance also take advantage of West Virginia's
position in the national marketplace. Though West Virginians struggle with
debt as much as the citizens of any other state, in absolute terms they comprise a
relatively small market. Through industry trade groups, debt settlement companies keep well apprised of one another's legal battles. Where companies see a
small market with an aggressive enforcement agency, they are less willing to
take on the costs of expensive litigation. Thus, at least until the market shifts,
the industry has shown little inclination to challenge the Attorney General's
position as expressed through the Assurances.
E.

The Attorney General's Strategy Works Best with the Federal Trade
Commission'sRecent Debt Settlement Regulations

As discussed above,297 new FTC rules governing the debt settlement industry went into effect in the fall of 2010. This series of amendments to the
1995 Telemarketing Sales Rule extends a number of important new protections
See W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n v. Moore, 411 S.E.2d 702, 707 (W. Va. 1991); Palumbo
v. Graley's Body Shop, 425 S.E.2d 177, 186 (W. Va. 1992).
295
McGraw v. Imperial Mktg, 472 S.E.2d 792, 794 (W. Va. 1996). ("The method of analysis
which governs the propriety and scope of an injunction under W. Va. Code 46A-7-110 (1974)
deviates from the customary standard for the issuance of temporary relief and may best be described as whether the Attorney General has shown by the existence of some credible evidence,
even if disputed, that reasonable cause exists to believe that the respondent is engaging in or is
likely to engage in conduct sought to be restrained.").
296
See supra Part III.B. 1 which explains that while a party bound to an Assurance of Discontinuance typically does not admit guilt, subsequent violation of the terms of the agreement may
constitute prima facie evidence of the party's guilt in an action initiated by the Attorney General.
297
See supra Part II.F.
294
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to consumers, but in contrast to the UDMSA, the new FTC rules work with,
rather than against, the Attorney General's strategy.
First, the FTC's recognition of the seriousness of the debt settlement
problem strengthens the Attorney General's stance against the industry. As
discussed above, consumer advocates have long been hindered by the lack of
publicly available information about debt settlement companies. During the
investigation and comment period leading up to the finalization of the TSR
amendments, however, the FTC collected and reported on a wealth of data,
much of which derived directly from the industry itself.2 98 This data is now
available to the Attorney General and will fuel its litigation in the future. Additionally, federal acknowledgement of the particular problems posed by up-front
fees is likely to be persuasive to judges considering the broader ban imposed
under West Virginia law.
Second, the protections offered by the FTC rules reduce the incentive
for West Virginia to legitimize the debt settlement industry by adopting the
UDMSA. The Uniform Act proposes a trade off: in return for licensing and
accepting the industry, it offers some protection. Thanks to the FTC rules, West
Virginians can enjoy structured protections 299 against the industry's worst
abuses without recognizing the legality of the industry as a whole.3 00 And although their effect remains to be seen, the FTC rules will likely provide stronger
protection for consumers as evidenced by the industry's strong preference for
the UDMSA.ol
Finally, the Attorney General's strategy and the new FTC rules can
work together as a comprehensive ban on the worst debt settlement abuses. As
discussed above, the FTC rules are a powerful tool, but they apply only to transactions conducted over the phone. In UDMSA states, consumers will still be
susceptible to companies that adapt to provide services via the Internet or
through face-to-face transactions. In West Virginia, the CSO Act, Debt Pooling
statute, and laws governing the unauthorized practice of law can fill the gaps left
by the FTC rules, while providing a flexible shield against whatever tactics the
industry may develop in the future.

An index of every comment or filing in response to the proposed TSR amendments is available at http://www.flc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/index.shtm.
299
Including disclosure requirements, prohibition of common misrepresentations, the advance
fee ban, and other protections. See supra Part II.F.
298

300

Goodman, supra note 54.

301

United States Organizations for Bankruptcy Alternatives, In the Matter of Telemarketing
Sales Rules - Debt Relief Amendments, COMMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR
BANKRUPTCY ALTERNATIVES, Oct. 26, 2009, at 16.
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V. CONCLUSION
As long as Americans, young and old, have access to ever-increasing
levels of personal credit, many consumers will continue to struggle under the
burden of unmanageable debt. And wherever there is consumer debt, companies such as today's debt settlement providers will spring-up, tempting beleaguered consumers with too-good-to-be-true promises of financial freedom.
There will always be a Roger, and debt settlement will always seem like a good
idea.
History has shown us that when consumers are most desperate, abuses
abound. The concept underlying the modem debt settlement industry is nothing
new, and unfortunately, neither are its attendant problems. Today, many debt
settlement providers are guilty of numerous deceptive or unfair practices that
can be extremely harmful to consumers. In marketing their services, debt settlement companies make unfounded claims about the services they offer, and
fail to disclose details about their programs that are critical in order for consumers to make informed, beneficial decisions. These companies often charge exorbitant fees while failing to provide services of any real value to consumers.
Debt settlement companies advise consumers to stop paying their creditors, resulting in ruined credit and even greater hardship for the majority of consumers
who are unable to complete a debt settlement program. They encourage consumers to avoid bankruptcy even when bankruptcy is a better option, and they
fail to inform consumers about the potential tax consequences of the debt settlement program.
Clearly, some form of regulation is needed. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recognized this when it created the Uniform Debt Management Services Act, a comprehensive regulatory plan for the
debt management and debt settlement industries. The UDMSA creates extensive registration requirements, mandates certain disclosures, limits fees, and
provides remedies for aggrieved consumers. The Uniform Act, however, is not
strictly a consumer protection measure. In keeping with the purposes of the
NCCUSL, the UDMSA exists in large part to facilitate the expansion of the debt
settlement industry. As a result, in many instances, the UDMSA often does not
go far enough to protect consumers from common abuses.
In West Virginia, the Attorney General has also recognized the problems posed by predatory debt settlement providers, and has addressed it by developing its own comprehensive strategy for regulating the industry under existing state and federal laws. Through enforcement of the Debt Pooling Statute,
Credit Services Organizations Act, the rules and regulations governing the unlicensed practice of law, and various provisions of the West Virginia Consumer
Credit and Protection Act, the Attorney General has successfully forced unscrupulous debt settlement providers into Assurances of Discontinuance under
which the companies make restitution to consumers and agree to cease their
harmful practices.
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For many reasons, the Attorney General's strategy is a far better fit for
West Virginia than the UDMSA. Unlike the Uniform Act, it is specifically tailored to the unique problems posed by debt settlement providers rather than the
debt management industry as a whole. It offers practically every substantive
protection available under the UDMSA, while prohibiting certain harmful practices that the Uniform Act allows. Under the UDMSA, the administrator has
relatively weak powers of enforcement. The West Virginia Attorney General,
on the other hand, has developed a relatively quick, low-cost, litigation-free, and
effective method for enforcing its strategy. Finally, the Attorney General's approach is flexible, adaptive, and more compatible with federal efforts to regulate
the debt settlement industry.
The UDMSA is a potent, much-needed, and well-reasoned solution to
many of the problems created by the debt settlement industry, and may be the
best available option in many jurisdictions. However, in West Virginia, adoption
of the UDMSA would force the Attorney General to affix its imprimatur to an
industry that it finds to be inherently harmful to consumers. It would likely result in an increase in the number of debt settlement companies doing business in
the state. It would undermine existing strategies that have served the citizens of
the state well, and most importantly, it would reduce the protections available to
desperate and vulnerable consumers. West Virginia has long been a leader in
consumer protection. If the Legislature seeks to continue in this tradition, with
respect to the debt settlement industry, it would be well-served not to "settle"
for the UDMSA.
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